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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From 1994 through as late as August 2001, the United States 
intelligence community1 received information that terrorists had 
seriously contemplated using airplanes as instruments for carrying out 
international terrorist attacks.2  This method of attack was clearly 
“discussed in terrorist circles,” yet community analysts demonstrated 
little effort to strategically counter such terrorist groups.3 
Moreover, in 1998, U.S. intelligence received specific information 
that “a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden 
plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.”4  In July  
2001, senior government officials were warned of “a significant terrorist 
attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks” that 
would be “spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties . . . with 
little or no warning.”5  Two months later, FBI and CIA units containing 
no more than sixty combined personnel were assigned the specific task 
of tracking terrorist kingpin Osama bin Laden, an intelligence method 
later viewed as inadequate with respect to the severity of the destructive 
threat involved.6 
Despite these findings,7 the eleventh day of September 2001 reminded 
 
 1. “Intelligence community” “refer[s] to the group of fourteen government 
agencies and organizations that, either in whole or in part, conduct the intelligence 
activities of the United States Government,” including, but not limited to, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  ELEANOR HILL, JOINT INQUIRY STAFF STATEMENT, Part I, 
at 6 (2002), available at http://i.CNN.net/CNN/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/18/intelligence. 
hearings/intel.911.report.pdf.  The intelligence community has various duties with respect to 
countering terrorism, including: “[c]ollecting, analyzing, and disseminating information 
regarding terrorist incidents and groups that perpetrate terrorism . . . ; [i]ssuing warnings 
to policymakers to counter potential terrorist threats; [p]reventing, pre-empting, and 
disrupting terrorist organizations; and [s]upporting diplomatic, legal, and military 
operations against terrorism.”  Id. at 7. 
 2. Id. at 9. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 15; see also Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, CNN.COM (Sept. 19, 
2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/18/intelligence.hearings.  In June  
1998, the United States received a stream of intelligence information from several 
sources that Osama bin Laden considered planning attacks specifically in New York and 
Washington, D.C.  HILL, supra note 1, at 15. 
 5. Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, supra note 4. 
 6. Id.  In addition, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted two communications 
sent by individuals in Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia on September 10, 2001, stating, 
“Tomorrow is zero hour,” and, “The match begins tomorrow.”  Kate Snow, FBI Seeks 
Senators’ Records in 9/11 Leak Probe, CNN.COM (Aug. 24, 2002), at http://www. 
CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/24/attacks.congress.leaks/index.html.  The messages 
were not translated into English until September 12.  HILL, supra note 1, at 22. 
 7. On July 24, 2003, Congress released more of the roughly eight-hundred-page, 
ten-month joint investigation report, which was the product of five thousand interviews 
and a review of nearly one million documents by House and Senate intelligence 
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Americans of the “‘systemic problems (that) might have prevented our 
government from detecting and disrupting al Qaeda’s plot.’”8  With constant 
reminders of the haunting images now burned into our memories by the 
international press, it is impossible to forget what transpired: four 
hijacked aircraft, a Manhattan skyline stripped of its twin towers, a 
gaping cavity in the Pentagon, and a death toll estimated at 2752 in New 
York City alone.9  But where the actions and reactions of tireless cleanup 
crews, dismayed firefighters, and grieving families were excessively 
recorded, the voices of officials elected to handle this crisis before and 
after it occurred were suppressed.  After an attack seeped through the 
cracks of U.S. intelligence, one question remained: How would the 
nation’s political branches respond? 
 
committees.  Congressional Report Cites “Missed Opportunities” Prior to 9/11, 
CNN.COM (July 24, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/24/9.11. 
report/index.html.  The report illustrated additional security lapses leading to the 
September 11, 2001 tragedies.  It noted that at least fourteen people, who had helped six 
of the hijackers “find housing, open bank accounts, obtain driver’s licenses and locate 
flight schools,” had come to the FBI’s attention before the attacks.  Id.  In fact, the CIA 
had tracked two particular hijackers, who later were aboard American Airlines Flight 77 
that crashed into the Pentagon, “to California after the men were photographed at an al 
Qaeda planning meeting . . . in January 2000,” a meeting where terrorists “were plotting 
the attack on the USS Cole.”  Brian Ross, Avoidable Tragedy? FBI Agent Didn’t Have 
CIA Information About Sept. 11 Hijackers, ABCNEWS.COM (July 24, 2003), at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/world/ sept11_intel030724. html.  The CIA’s intelligence 
information was, however, not relayed to the FBI, whose San Diego-based agent could 
have easily monitored the hijackers, particularly when both men rented rooms in the 
house of the agent’s informant.  Id.  According to the Congressional Joint Inquiry 
Report, this San Diego connection could have been “perhaps the Intelligence 
Community’s best chance to unravel the September 11 plot.”  Id.  The report also 
acknowledged: “The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of 
reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could 
have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama Bin Ladin’s plan 
to attack these United States on September 11, 2001.”  S. REP. NO. 107-351, H.R. REP. 
NO.  107-792, at xv (2002).  Nearly two years after the September 11 attacks, the report 
proclaimed that the government “still lacks a consolidated terrorism watch list that is 
easily accessible to all law enforcement.”  Pierre Thomas, Intelligence Failure: U.S. 
Government Still Lacks Centralized Terrorist Watch List, ABCNEWS.COM (Apr. 29, 
2003), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/US/sept11failure_030429.html. 
 8. Report Cites Warnings Before 9/11, supra note 4 (quoting Chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee Bob Graham).  Graham noted that the intent of the 
intelligence report was “not to point a finger or pin blame,” and that identifying and 
stopping the threat “wouldn’t have taken a lot of luck.  It would have taken someone 
who could have asked and gotten answers to the right follow-up questions and then put it 
together.”  Id. 
 9. Dan Barry, A New Account of Sept. 11 Loss, with 40 Fewer Souls to Mourn, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A1. 
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Part II of this Comment begins to answer that question with an 
overview of the current political climate, focusing primarily on the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 200110 (Patriot 
Act)—the legislature’s answer to “9/11.”  Part II then summarizes the 
resulting negative reaction by civil libertarians contending that the 
Patriot Act unconstitutionally takes away individual freedoms under the 
guise of stopping terrorism.  As Part II demonstrates, public support for 
the government’s position is hard to find. 
Part III focuses on one of the legislature’s previous attempts to deter 
terrorism.  The integral Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
199611 (AEDPA) prohibits donations of material support and resources 
to foreign terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, so as to prevent the 
United States from being used as a base for terrorist funding.  Part III 
first reviews the statute and its relevant antifundraising provisions12 and 
then chronicles the AEDPA during a two-year time period in which it 
overcame a variety of constitutional challenges, including those based on 
the freedom of association and the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 
Part IV documents the immediate downfall of the AEDPA and focuses 
on the district court opinion in United States v. Rahmani,13 a post-9/11 
decision declaring the AEDPA facially unconstitutional for violating 
procedural due process.14  Part IV argues that the explosive nature of 
contemporary international hostilities requires the nation to safeguard its 
homeland before extending due process rights to terrorist organizations 
and their supporters. 
In defense of national security measures, this Comment provides four 
factors that, if met, justify the AEDPA as an appropriate crisis law despite 
its abridgement of some due process rights.  These factors help distinguish 
legitimate measures from previous blatant attacks on individual freedoms, 
 
 10. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 42 & 50 U.S.C.). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–1319 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 
18, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 12. This Comment refrains from discussing the Act’s immigration provisions or its 
impact on race relations, which have both incurred heavy criticism for targeting 
minorities and foreigners.  For a discussion on how the AEDPA targets Arab-Americans, 
see generally Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United 
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2883 (2001) (suggesting 
various corrective measures to achieve equal justice for Arabs in America); see also 
Adrienne R. Bellino, Comment, Changing Immigration for Arabs with Anti-terrorism 
Legislation: September 11th Was Not the Catalyst, 16 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 
123–24 (2002) (arguing that the AEDPA profiles Arabs as terrorists and enemies). 
 13. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 14. Id. at 1055. 
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including the Alien and Sedition Acts of 179815 and the operation of 
Japanese internment camps during World War II.16  Finally, Part IV 
criticizes the Rahmani court for adjudicating the validity of the AEDPA 
without appropriate statutory authorization. 
The United States is not only fighting the war on terror overseas; it is 
concurrently fighting a legal war to protect against terror domestically.  
Amidst concern that 9/11 induced the government to overreact, this 
Comment urges courts to assist the struggling intelligence community, 
accept certain security measures, recognize that these measures may 
justifiably encumber the Constitution, and resurrect the AEDPA. 
II.  THE CURRENT POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: PUSHING                             
FORWARD DESPITE PUBLIC DISSENT 
With emotion still raw just three days after 9/11, both the Senate and 
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the “Authorization 
for Use of Military Force” resolution.17  The resolution granted President 
Bush the statutory authority to use U.S. Armed Forces against those 
responsible for the attacks.18  Amidst concern over unwisely giving the 
President too much leeway, especially because the resolution was the 
first of its kind since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Senate Minority Leader 
Trent Lott responded: “These are different times, and we must act 
 
 15. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 137 (2d ed. 2002). 
 16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (upholding the 
conviction of an American citizen of Japanese descent for remaining in a designated 
“military area” from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded). 
 17. Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001)) (signed by President Bush 
on Sept. 18, 2001).  “The resolution was formally introduced in the Senate on the 
morning of September 14, 2001, passed immediately . . . by a vote of 98–0, passed later 
that day by the House of Representatives after extensive discussion by a vote of 420–1, 
and signed by the President on September 18, 2001.”  David Abramowitz, The President, 
the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Considerations in Authorizing Use 
of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 71 n.1 (2002) 
(discussing the manner in which members of Congress reached a compromise in drafting 
the text of the resolution). 
 18. S.J. Res. 23, § 2(a).  The measure authorized President Bush 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, 
or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
Id. 
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decisively.  The American people expect it, and they will accept nothing 
less. . . .  The world has changed, and we are acting appropriately.”19 
While the resolution allowed for force in finding and punishing the 
perpetrators and sponsors of 9/11, it did not authorize the President to 
use force against anyone who might be considering future acts of 
terrorism, nor did it encompass how the President may bolster U.S. 
intelligence.20  Rather, it was a landmark act passed in the wake of 9/11 
that specifically called for broader tracking measures, giving officials 
greater authority to trace and intercept communications for law enforcement 
and foreign intelligence purposes.21  The often chastised Patriot Act,22 
signed into law on October 26, 2001, permits government agencies to 
gather information on individuals within the United States “through 
enhanced intelligence surveillance procedures, limited judicial oversight 
of telephone and internet surveillance, and the ability of law enforcement 
to delay notice of search warrants.”23 
 
 19. See Congress Approves Resolution Authorizing Force, CNN.COM/U.S. (Sept. 
15, 2001), at http://www.CNN.com/2001/US/09/15/congress.terrorism/index.html. 
 20. See Abramowitz, supra note 17, at 73 & n.7 (citing Alan Fram, Associated 
Press, Bush Anti-Terror Aid Request Doubled (Sept. 13, 2001)) (reporting that some 
lawmakers opposed earlier resolution language that approved President Bush to “deter 
and pre-empt any related future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States” 
because that “would have gone too far in eliminating Congress’ role in future 
incidents”). 
 21. Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Sketch, Congressional Research 
Service (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf. 
 22. Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 
42 & 50 U.S.C.).  The Patriot Act is long and complex, amounting to 342 pages in ten 
parts, amending over fifteen different statutes, and covering a variety of subjects from 
immigration, to money laundering, to surveillance, to assisting victims of terrorism.  
EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that Relate to Online Activities, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/ 
Terrorism_ militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.php; see also John W. Whitehead 
& Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A 
Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2002).  Upon signing the Patriot 
Act, President Bush emphasized: “As of today, we’re changing the laws governing 
information-sharing.  And as importantly, we’re changing the culture of our various 
agencies that fight terrorism.  Countering and investigating terrorist activity is the 
number one priority for both law enforcement and intelligence agencies.”  President 
George W. Bush, Remarks at the White House Signing of the USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001 (Oct. 26, 2001), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/terrorism/ 
bush_terrorismbill.html.  Bush also noted: “The bill before me takes account of the new 
realities and dangers posed by modern terrorists.  It will help law enforcement to 
identify, to dismantle, to disrupt, and to punish terrorists before they strike.”  Id.  For a 
firsthand account of America’s response to 9/11 through the lives of various people on 
the front lines, including Attorney General John Ashcroft’s personal excursion during the 
creation of the Patriot Act, see STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: HOW AMERICA CONFRONTED THE 
SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 14 (2003). 
 23. Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 963 (2002) (citing Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
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Numerous judicial scholars and political activists alike argue that the 
Patriot Act articulates politicians’ desperate attempts to give Americans 
a quick fix, thereby unduly sacrificing citizens’ rights of privacy and 
providing the executive branch with an overreaching power not subject 
to any meaningful check or balance.24  Accordingly, critics tab the Patriot 
Act as a “rush job” not having been carefully studied by Congress,25 
proceeding at a “‘blistering pace’ despite containing several controversial 
 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 42 & 50 U.S.C.)).  Evans 
argues that the Patriot Act potentially violates guaranteed Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Id. at 974.  As explained by CNN, major provisions of the Patriot Act 
include authorizing “roving wiretaps” in order for law enforcement to wiretap any 
phone, especially cellular and disposable phones, that a suspected terrorist would use; 
permitting “the federal government to detain non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism for 
up to seven days without specific charges” (the Bush Administration originally hoped to 
detain them indefinitely); granting “law enforcement officials greater subpoena power 
for e-mail records of terrorist suspects”; and “[e]xpanding measures against money 
laundering by requiring additional record keeping and reports for certain transactions and 
requiring identification of account holders.”  See Explaining the U.S.A. Patriot Act, 
CNN.COM (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/LAW/08/23/patriot.act.explainer. 
 24. Michael F. Dowley, Note, Government Surveillance Powers Under the USA 
PATRIOT Act: Is It Possible to Protect National Security and Privacy at the Same Time? 
A Constitutional Tug-of-War, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 165, 165 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted).  Many of these checks and balances that the Patriot Act eliminates were 
implemented after both domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies abused their 
surveillance power, including the 1974 revelation that the FBI had spied on over ten 
thousand U.S. citizens including Martin Luther King, Jr.  EFF Analysis of the Provisions 
of the USA Patriot Act that Relate to Online Activities, supra note 22.  Now, with the 
advent of the latest antiterrorism legislation, “two out of three branches of the federal 
government are also being left out of the loop in a growing number of circumstances.”  
Susan Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the US Department of Justice: Losing Our 
Balances?, JURIST (Dec. 3, 2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm. 
 25. EFF Analysis of the Provisions of the USA Patriot Act that Relate to Online 
Activities, supra note 22; see Evans, supra note 23, at 985; see also Nat Hentoff, 
Terrorizing the Bill of Rights: “Why Should We Care?  It’s Only the Constitution,” 
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20, 2001, at 32 (describing Wisconsin Congressman David Obey’s 
reaction to the Patriot Act as “a backroom quick fix,” and sarcastically noting: “It’s only 
the Constitution [at stake]”), available at http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0146/ 
hentoff.php (2001); George A. Lyden, Note, The International Money Laundering 
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001: Congress Wears a Blindfold While 
Giving Money Laundering Legislation a Facelift, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 201, 
202 (2003) (noting that the Patriot Act was “rammed through Congress” as “one of the 
‘swiftest-moving bills in federal history’”) (footnote omitted).  The Patriot Act “was 
introduced in the House of Representatives on October 23, 2001,” and “[p]ursuant to a 
rule waiver, it was passed the next day by a vote of 357-to-66.”  Whitehead & Aden, 
supra note 22, at 1087 n.26.  The Senate then approved the Patriot Act “without 
amendment by a vote of 98-to-1 on October 26th,” the same day President Bush signed it 
into law.  Id. 
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criminal provisions that Congress had rejected in previous years.”26  
Complainants claim it impacts the lives of innocent Americans rather 
than those of hostile terrorists,27 successfully doing so while sneaking 
past the awareness, or lack thereof, of average law-abiding citizens by 
masking itself as primarily relating to foreign nationals and focusing on 
terrorism.28  As a result, the Patriot Act has been attacked for containing 
provisions that, in reality, have little to do with terrorism and more to do 
with satisfying an FBI surveillance “wish list” that includes intrusive 
techniques such as snooping in on people’s computer use and meddling 
with individual medical records.29 
 
 26. Regina Germain, Rushing to Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the 
USA Patriot Act for Bona Fide Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 505 (2002) (citing 
Jonathan Lancaster, Anti-Terrorism Bill Is Approved; Bush Cheers House’s Quick 
Action, But Civil Liberties Advocates Are Alarmed, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2001, at A1) 
(discussing generally how the Patriot Act is likely to affect asylum adjudications).  In an 
October 12, 2001 address, the lone dissenting voter in the Senate, Senator Russell 
Feingold (D-Wis.), stated the following: 
It is one thing to shortcut the legislative process in order to get federal financial 
aid to the cities hit by terrorism.  We did that, and no one complained that we 
moved too quickly.  It is quite another to press for the enactment of sweeping 
new powers for law enforcement that directly affect the civil liberties of the 
American people without due deliberation by the peoples’ elected representatives. 
Senator Russell Feingold, On Opposing the U.S.A. Patriot Act, Address to the 
Associated Press Managing Editors Conference (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www. 
archipelago.org/vol6-2/feingold.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). 
 27. Anne Uyeda, The USA Patriot Act May Infringe on Civil Liberties in 
Cyberspace, 2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. NOTES 1 (noting that with the existence of the 
Patriot Act, “many Americans should become cautious about the terms they type into 
their search engines”) at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/notes/2002/01_020204_uyeda.php 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2004); see Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1083 (“Americans’ 
liberties have been trammeled in a variety of different ways.”); see also Gore Accuses 
Bush of Undermining Freedoms, CNN.COM (Nov. 9, 2003) (“[Former Vice President Al 
Gore] called for a repeal of most of the USA Patriot Act, saying its few useful provisions 
are far outweighed by those [Gore] said are impinging on American freedoms.”), at 
http://www.CNN.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/11/09/gore.bush/index.html. 
 28. Jennifer Van Bergen, Repeal the USA Patriot Act, Truthout, Part I (Apr. 1, 
2002), at http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/04.02A.JVB.Patriot.htm. 
 29. Hentoff, supra note 25; see Feingold, supra note 26; see also Michael Isikoff, 
Show Me the Money, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2003, at 36 (reporting on the federal 
government’s use of the money laundering provision in the Patriot Act to investigate the 
records of three Las Vegas officials accused of accepting bribes from the city’s largest 
strip club owner Michael Galardi—in 2003, the “Feds have used the Patriot Act to 
conduct searches on 962 suspects, yielding ‘hits’ on 6,397 financial records.  Of those, 
two thirds (4,261) were in money-laundering cases with no apparent terror connection.”).  
But see Justice Document: Patriot Act Provision Never Used, CNN.COM (Sept. 17, 2003) 
(reporting that section 215 of the Patriot Act, criticized for allowing the FBI under secret 
court order to seize tangible items such as business records from any private business, 
including hospitals and libraries, has actually never been utilized according to the 
Justice Department), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/LAW/09/17/ashcroft.patriot.  
One answer to the allegation that the Patriot Act strips away civil liberties is that because 
the Attorney General retains a great amount of discretion in exercising the powers 
provided therein, the Patriot Act is not so severe.  Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot 
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Critics suggest that the government has taken full advantage of a 
national crisis, capitalizing on 9/11 to substantiate long desired executive 
powers previously viewed as “politically unacceptable in peacetime.”30  
Even harsher reactions are assured when the Bush Administration 
attempts to inconspicuously finalize its bold and more comprehensive 
sequel legislation to the Patriot Act, entitled the “Domestic Security 
Enhancement Act of 2003”31 or “Patriot Act II.”  The proposed legislation, 
if passed, would further expand law enforcement’s authority to gather 
intelligence, sanctions the use of secret arrests, and seeks to seize U.S. 
citizenship status from persons who belong to or support disfavored 
political groups.32  Opponents contend that the proposal goes so far as to 
 
Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 451–52 (2002).  Thus, although some provisions may 
allow the executive branch to, for example, deport a non-U.S. citizen who donates 
coloring books to a terrorist organization, the resulting action is not always automatic.  
See id.  Mitigating interests may factor into the administration’s use of its newly 
delegated powers, such as public policy, and it is up to the courts and Congress to 
remedy any abuses.  Id.  For an argument that the Patriot Act does not “expand law 
enforcement powers dramatically,” see Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the 
USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 608–09 (2003) 
(explaining how conventional wisdom regarding the Patriot Act “misses the mark”). 
 30. McCarthy, supra note 29, at 451 & n.117 (citing Administration’s Draft Anti-
Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 
57 (2001) (statement of Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.)) (alleging that “law enforcement urged 
swift passage as a means of taking ‘advantage of what is obviously an emergency 
situation to obtain authorities that it has been unable to obtain previously’”) (quoting 
Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.)); see also Feingold, supra note 26 (noting that a certain proposal, 
relating to criminal forfeiture laws, within the Patriot Act “was simply an effort on the 
part of the [Justice] Department to take advantage of the emergency situation and get 
something that they’ve wanted to get for a long time”). 
 31. The Center for Public Integrity in Washington, D.C. obtained a copy of an 
undisclosed draft, dated January 9, 2003, of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 
2003 and made it available in full text.  See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, The Center 
for Public Integrity, Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act, at 
http://publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0&L4=0&
L5=0 (Feb. 7, 2003).  The Justice Department has not officially released the bill.  Even if 
“[i]t would be premature to speculate on any future decisions,” it is rumored that the bill 
expands law enforcement privileges and creates a “substantial new terrorist identification 
database.”  Id.; see Will There Be a Patriot Act Part II?, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., Feb. 
2003, at 2; see also Rupal Shah, Administration Drafts “Patriot Act II,” Activists 
Concerned, INDIA-W., Feb. 28, 2003, at A26 (discussing how the Patriot Act II is already 
drawing stiff opposition). 
 32. Lewis & Mayle, supra note 31.  The Justice Department may already conceal 
the names of hundreds of foreigners detained after 9/11, despite the cries of more than 
twenty civil liberties groups invoking the Freedom of Information Act, a law requiring 
disclosure of certain government files.  Smita Nordwall, Ruling Favors U.S. on 9/11 
Detainees, USA TODAY, June 18, 2003, at 5A.  The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, by a two-to-one vote, held that disclosing the names of detainees may “give 
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subject an antiwar protestor to the death penalty if the protestor breaks 
the law during a demonstration resulting in someone’s death.33  Once 
 
terrorists insight into the government’s Sept. 11 investigation” and that federal judges, 
when asked to compel disclosures, should defer to the Bush Administration’s concerns 
that such disclosures assist the “nation’s enemies.”  Id.  The majority wrote: “Disclosure 
would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the investigation.  
Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists which of their members were compromised 
by the investigation, and which were not.”  Mark J. Prendergast, Names of 9/11 
Detainees Can Remain Secret, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003 (quoting Ctr. for 
Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).  In 
dissent, Judge David S. Tatel noted that disclosure would allow the public to determine 
whether the government abused “one of its most awesome powers,” the power to “arrest 
and jail.” Id. (Tatel, J. dissenting) (citing Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 937–38).  
The public may then determine particularly whether individuals were detained solely 
because of their religion and ethnicity and for long periods of time without 
communication with legal counsel.  Id.  Attorney General John Ashcroft responded: “We 
are pleased the court agreed we should not give terrorists a virtual road map to our 
investigation that could allow terrorists to chart a potentially deadly detour around our 
efforts.”  Id. 
 33. E.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says New 
Ashcroft Bill Erodes Checks and Balances on Presidential Power; Patriot II Legislation 
Would Needlessly Infringe on Basic Constitutional Liberties (Feb. 12, 2003), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11817&c=206 (citing § 411).  
As portrayed by the ACLU, the new legislation, if passed into law, would: 
Make it easier for the government to initiate surveillance and wiretapping of 
U.S. citizens under the shadowy, top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court.  (Sections 101, 102 and 107) 
Shelter federal agents engaged in illegal surveillance without a court order 
from criminal prosecution if they are following orders of high Executive 
Branch officials.  (Section 106) 
Authorize, in statute, the Department of Justice’s campaign of secret detentions 
by including a provision that would preempt federal litigation challenging non-
disclosure of basic information about detainees.  (Section 201) 
Threaten public health by severely restricting access to crucial information 
about environmental health risks posed by facilities that use dangerous 
chemicals.  (Section 202) 
Harm Americans’ ability to receive a fair trial by limiting defense attorneys 
from challenging the use of secret evidence.  (Section 204) 
Reduce the ability of grand jury witnesses in terrorism investigations to defend 
themselves against public accusations by gagging them from discussing their 
testimony with the media or the general public.  (Section 206) 
Allow for the sampling and cataloguing of innocent Americans’ genetic 
information without court order and without consent.  (Sections 301–306) 
Permit, without any connection to anti-terrorism efforts, sensitive personal 
information about U.S. citizens to be shared with local and state law 
enforcement.  (Section 311) 
Undercut trust between police departments and immigrant communities by 
opening sensitive visa files to local police for the enforcement of complex 
immigration laws.  (Section 311) 
Terminate court-approved limits on police spying, which were initially put in 
place to prevent McCarthy-style law enforcement persecution based on 
political or religious affiliation.  (Section 312) 
Provide an incentive for neighbor to spy on neighbor and pose problems 
similar to those inherent in Attorney General Ashcroft’s “Operation TIPS” by 
granting blanket immunity to businesses that phone in false terrorism tips, even 
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again, discontent has arisen over the lack of review by Congress in the 
face of such broad legislation.34 
The political climate since 9/11 continues to revolve around the fiery 
debate between civil libertarians, stoutly protesting against the abridgement 
of any constitutional right, and the legislature,35 filled with alacrity and 
motivated by a ubiquitous fear of repeat terrorism.  New surveillance 
programs such as the aviation industry’s Computer Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System II (CAPPS II),36 which is designed to scan public 
and private databases for information on individuals traveling to and 
from the United States in order to designate passengers as potential 
security threats, only add fuel to the fire.37  The government clearly 
 
if their actions are taken with reckless disregard for the truth.  (Section 313) 
Further criminalize association—without any intent to commit acts of 
terrorism—with unpopular organizations labeled as terrorist by our government.  
(Section 402) 
Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, unfairly target undocumented workers 
with extended jail terms for common immigration offenses.  (Section 502) 
Provide for summary deportations without evidence of crime or criminal 
intent, even of lawful permanent residents, whom the Attorney General says 
are a threat to national security.  (Section 503) 
Abolish fair hearings for lawful permanent residents convicted of criminal 
offenses through an “expedited removal” procedure, and prevent any court 
from questioning the government’s unlawful actions by explicitly exempting 
these cases from habeas corpus.  Congress has not exempted any person from 
habeas corpus—a protection guaranteed by the Constitution—since the Civil 
War.  (Section 504) 
Id. 
 34. See Administration Formulates “Patriot II” with Harsher Immigration 
Provisions, 80 NO. 8 INTERPRETER RELEASES 270, 272 (2003). 
 35. Some lawmakers however, including Republicans, have introduced the 
Security and Freedom Ensured Act (SAFE Act), which responds to the Patriot Act’s 
threats to civil rights. See Ashcroft Warns of Bush Veto on Scaled-Back Patriot Bill, 
CNN.COM (Jan. 29, 2004), at http://www.CNN.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/patriot.act.ap.  
The SAFE Act, if passed, would “impose expiration dates on nationwide search warrants 
and other Patriot Act provisions.”  Id.  The SAFE Act has yet to reach a hearing in either 
branch of Congress, yet Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an advance warning, 
stating that passing the proposed legislation would “undermine our ongoing campaign to 
detect and prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks.”  Id. 
 36. See Elliot Borin, Private Info Becoming Plane Truth, WIRED NEWS (Sept. 16, 
2002), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,55037,00.html.  Called the “nation’s 
largest domestic surveillance system,” the CAPPS II program may be extended to screen 
individuals in other methods of transportation that involve the public’s trust, including 
truckers, railroad conductors, and subway workers.  Robert O’Harrow Jr., Air Security 
Focusing on Flier Screening, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2002, at A1. 
 37. The ACLU reports that the types of information collected by the CAPPS II 
program may include “financial and transactional data,” credit card purchases, housing 
information, communications records, health records, and legal records.  Press Release, 
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wishes to push its policies forward to fight terror,38 even at the risk of 
passing overinclusive39 reform, despite public demonstrations of dissent 
and plain ignorance. 
III.  THE AEDPA OF 1996 
A.  At Issue: Prohibiting Material Support to Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations 
The Patriot Act is not the legislature’s first attempt at combating 
international and domestic terrorism.40  In one of its previous efforts, 
responding to the 1993 World Trade Center41 and 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombings,42 a bipartisan Congress introduced43 the AEDPA.44  Signed 
 
American Civil Liberties Union, CAPPS II Data-Mining System Will Invade Privacy 
and Create Government Blacklist of Americans, ACLU Warns (Feb. 27, 2003), at 
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=11956&c=130.  ACLU legislative counsel Katie 
Corrigan claims that once CAPPS II determines that an individual is a security threat, the 
program does not allow the suspect to review the information on which the decision was 
based or permit the suspect to appeal the designation.  See id.  Director of the ACLU’s 
Technology and Liberty Program Barry Steinhardt adds, “Nothing like [CAPPS II] has 
ever been done in this country.”  Id. 
 38. On June 5, 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft urged Congress to expand 
the Patriot Act’s powers, including increasing the number of federal terror-related crimes 
punishable by life sentences or the death penalty.  Richard B. Schmitt, Stiffer Terror 
Laws Urged, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at A1.  Ashcroft also sought to deny bail entirely 
to suspected terrorists.  Id. 
 39. One proposed explanation as to why many of the new powers implemented by 
the Patriot Act seem to extend beyond terrorism is because “legislators simply lacked the 
time and opportunity to develop complex, nuanced definitions that would be neither 
over-inclusive nor under-inclusive.”  McCarthy, supra note 29, at 451.  Thus, due to the 
perceived threat to the country not only from 9/11 but also from the subsequent anthrax 
contamination and pressure from the Bush Administration, Congress “erred on the side 
of over-inclusiveness.”  Id.  For more information on the post-9/11 anthrax 
investigations, see Confirmed Anthrax Cases, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at A8. 
 40. For a brief discussion on past antiterrorism laws with surveillance 
implications, including Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (OCCSSA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), see 
Evans, supra note 23, at 952–58. 
 41. On February 26, 1993, six people were killed and a thousand others were 
injured when a truck carrying a twelve hundred-pound bomb was detonated in the World 
Trade Center’s parking garage.  On November 12, 1997, after three days of deliberation, 
a federal jury convicted Ramzi Yousef, then twenty-nine years old, and Eyad Ismoil, 
then twenty-six, on murder and conspiracy charges for their roles in the Islamic 
extremists’ plot to bomb the Trade Center.  Yousef was one of the ringleaders, while 
Ismoil was accused of driving the truck into the parking garage.  After the attack, both 
fled from the United States on commercial airline flights, only to be captured in 1995.  
The attack “brought home to the American public their possible vulnerability to Middle 
Eastern terrorism.”  Jury Convicts 2 in Trade Center Blast, CNN.COM (Nov. 12, 1997), at 
http://www.CNN.com/US/9711/12/world.trade.center/index.html. 
 42. On April 19, 1995, 168 people, including nineteen children, were killed and 
850 others were injured in the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil until 9/11, when a 
massive bomb inside a rental truck exploded in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
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into law by President Clinton on April 24, 1996,45 the AEDPA principally 
 
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  Whidden, supra note 12, at 2825; Evans, supra 
note 23, at 933 n.2 (citing Oklahoma City Tragedy: The Bombing, CNN.COM, at 
http://www.CNN.com/US/OKC/bombing.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2003)).  Timothy 
McVeigh, “an extremist who wrote of making blood flow in the streets of America . . . 
was found guilty of eight counts of capital murder . . . one count of conspiracy to use a 
weapon of mass destruction, one count of actually using that weapon and one count of 
destruction by explosive.”  McVeigh Guilty, CNN.COM (June 2, 1997), at http://www.CNN. 
com/US/9706/02/mcveigh.verdict/index.html.  McVeigh was executed by lethal injection 
on June 11, 2001 in the first federal execution since 1963.  Timothy McVeigh Dead, 
CNN.com/LAW CENTER (June 11, 2001), at http://www.CNN.com/2001/LAW/ 06/11/ 
mcveigh.01/index.html.  Terry Nichols was also convicted for his role in the Oklahoma 
City bombing, sentenced to life imprisonment, and ordered to pay the government $14 
million for the damages caused to the federal building.  See Evans, supra note 23, at 933 
n.2 (citing Nichols Gets Life for Oklahoma Bombing, CNN.COM (June 4, 1998), at 
http://www.CNN.com/US/ 9703/okc.trial/nichols.sentence/index.html). 
 43. Legislators responded to “give law enforcement the tools it needs to do 
everything possible to prevent [a tragedy like the Oklahoma City bombing] from 
happening again.”  Whidden, supra note 12, at 2825 n.4 (citing Presidential Statement 
on Senate Passage of Antiterrorism Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 993 
(June 7, 1995)).  The response was not immediate however, as the House did not endorse 
the bill introduced by the Senate in June 1995 “until almost one year after the bombing.”  
Evans, supra note 23, at 958 n.163 (citing William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive 
Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 107 (2000)). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–1319 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.).  The AEDPA consists of nine titles covering 
“areas such as justice for victims, habeas corpus reform, international terrorism 
prohibitions, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons restrictions, implementation of 
plastic explosives convention, terrorist and criminal alien removal and exclusion, 
criminal-law modifications to counter terrorism, and assistance to law enforcement.”  
Roberto Iraola, Due Process, Judicial Review, the First Amendment, and the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 78 N.D. L. REV. 1, 5 n.28 (2002) 
(citing Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214–17).  Although the AEDPA has been 
described as a “first-stage preemptive approach to combating terrorism,” the purpose of 
the AEDPA is to “deter terrorism.”  Id. at 5 (citing Stephen C. Warneck, Note, A 
Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the Financial Strength of 
International Terrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 177, 179 (1998)).  Warneck 
concludes that the AEDPA affects, and advocates how it attacks, the “underlying 
financial structures of terrorist organizations.”  Warneck, supra, at 182.  The Center for 
National Security Studies, however, has called the AEDPA “a major blow to the Bill of 
Rights” that “represents the worst setback for civil liberties in many years.”  Center for 
National Security Studies, Terrorism Law Is Major Setback for Civil Liberties, at 
http://www.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/cnss_habeas.html (June 20, 1996).  The AEDPA has 
also been called the “direct antecedent” of the Patriot Act.  Emanuel Gross, The 
Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in the United States: The Aftermath of 
September 11, 2001,  28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 15 (2002) (noting, however,  
that the Patriot Act is “more far reaching than the AEDPA in terms of the powers granted 
to the enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, and the extent to which [these 
powers] violate human rights”). 
 45. The Clinton Administration considered the prior “anti-terrorism laws to be ‘a 
AGARWAL.DOC 9/17/2019  11:04 AM 
 
852 
consists of stronger immigration laws through amendment of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.46 
At issue in this Comment is how the AEDPA fights terrorism by 
prohibiting persons from knowingly providing “material support or 
resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.”47  Specifically, 
 
confusing patchwork of measures’” and thus decided “to take an even tougher stance 
against terrorism.”  Roberta Smith, Note, America Tries to Come to Terms with 
Terrorism: The United States Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 v. 
British Anti-Terrorism Law and International Response, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
249, 261 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  Not included in the AEDPA, however, were 
provisions sponsored by Clinton that would have enhanced “wiretapping capabilities of 
all telephones used by suspected terrorists” and granted the government access to 
terrorists’ records, including consumer credit reports.  Id. at 269.  In response to 
increased terrorist acts on Americans, the Clinton Administration had drafted the 
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act in February 1995, two months before the bombing in 
Oklahoma City, to, among other things, “provide clear Federal criminal jurisdiction for 
any international terrorist attack that might occur in the United States.”  Id. at 260–61 
(quoting President’s Message to Congress Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, 31 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 227 (Feb. 9, 1995)).  President Clinton expanded the bill 
soon after the Oklahoma City incident and urged quick action from the Senate.  Jennifer 
A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 694–95 (1998) (discussing 
the constitutionality of the AEDPA in its beginning stages).  For a criticism of different 
components of the initially drafted Omnibus Act, see Center for National Security 
Studies, Clinton Terrorism Legislation Threatens Constitutional Rights, at http://www. 
cdt.org/policy/terrorism/cnss.cti.anal.html (Apr. 26, 1995). 
 46. See Evans, supra note 23, at 958 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1251–59 (2000)).  
One of the more controversial provisions, AEDPA § 440(d), disallows legal aliens 
convicted of certain enumerated crimes from obtaining waivers of deportation.  See 
AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(d), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered 
sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 & 50 U.S.C.).  See generally Anjali Parekh Prakash, Note, 
Changing the Rules: Arguing Against Retroactive Application of Deportation Statutes, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1423 (1997) (noting that § 440(d) “may deprive a permanent 
resident of discretionary relief and thus attach a new legal consequence of automatic 
deportation to certain criminal convictions”).  The resulting automatic deportation sets 
forth a larger class of individuals, albeit those with criminal records, that are denied the 
chance to plead their cases before a possibly sympathetic immigration judge.  See id. at 
1421.  President Clinton publicly opposed the AEDPA’s immigration provisions as he 
signed the legislation, “calling them ‘ill-advised’ and stating that they ‘reach beyond the 
scope of counter terrorism efforts.’”  Lisa C. Solbakken, Note, The Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism 
Pretext, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1381 n.4 (1997) (citation omitted) (discussing 
generally how the AEDPA effects constitutional rights traditionally afforded to legal 
aliens); see also President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 721 (Apr. 24, 1996).  Even the 
Patriot Act, often criticized for expanding previous antiterrorism laws, cut back on one 
AEDPA immigration provision that mandated detention for those seeking asylum until 
their claims were adjudicated.  McCarthy, supra note 29, at 448.  The Patriot Act 
presently “authorizes detention for only seven days, after which the government must 
bring immigration or criminal charges.”  Id. at 449 (footnote omitted). 
 47. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001)).  The section sets forth unlawful conduct as 
follows: 
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the AEDPA authorizes the Secretary of State (Secretary), in consultation 
with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury,48 to 
designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization” if the 
Secretary finds the following: (A) The organization is a foreign 
organization,49 (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity,50 and 
 
Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 
Id.  The Patriot Act “also aims to stop terrorism by disrupting terrorist financial networks 
through Title III of the Act, the International Money Laundering and Abatement and 
Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.”  McCarthy, supra note 29, at 446–47 (citing § 
301, 115 Stat. at 296).  The money laundering provisions of the Patriot Act mandate that 
banks and other financial institutions keep an eye on “account activity and . . . report 
suspicious transactions.”  Id. at 448. 
 48. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1250 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1189(c)(4) (2000)).  The term “Secretary,” as used in the statute, “means the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.”  Id. 
 49. Neither the AEDPA nor the entire United States Code defines the term “foreign 
organization.”  Joshua A. Ellis, Note, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under 
the AEDPA: The National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process, 
2002 BYU L. REV. 675, 679.  However, “a few unrelated sections of the Code of Federal 
Regulations,” including 12 C.F.R. § 347.102(k) (2001), do include a definition of 
“foreign organization” as “‘an organization that is organized under the laws of a foreign 
country.’”  Ellis, supra, at 679 n.26.  The Patriot Act amends the definition of “terrorist 
organization,” expanding it to mean “any group that engages in violence or destruction 
of property.”  McCarthy, supra note 29, at 450 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411, 115 
Stat. at 346–48).  Opponents of this definition remain unsatisfied, claiming that it is not 
limited to foreign or international groups, encompassing even “advocacy groups causing 
minor property damage during an act of civil disobedience.”  Id. 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2001).  Generally, “terrorist activity” 
includes the following acts, or the threat, attempt, or conspiracy to engage in: (i) 
hijacking or sabotaging an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle; (ii) seizing, detaining, or 
threatening to kill an individual in order to compel a third person (including a 
government organization) to do or abstain from doing an act; (iii) attacking an 
internationally protected person; (iv) engaging in an assassination; and (v) using 
biological or chemical agents, nuclear weapons, explosives, or firearms with the intent to 
endanger others or damage property.  Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(V). 
An organization engages in terrorist activity when it commits or incites another to 
commit a terrorist activity, when it prepares or plans a terrorist activity, when it 
“gather[s] information on potential targets for terrorist activity,” when it solicits funds 
for a terrorist activity or another terrorist organization, or when it solicits an individual to 
engage in a terrorist activity or to become a member of a terrorist organization.  Id. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I)–(V).  Thus, the statute provides that a donor has to know or have 
reason to believe that the individual to whom he was providing support has committed or 
planned to commit a terrorist activity.  Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(bb).  Furthermore, an 
organization engages in terrorist activity when it provides material support “for the 
commission of a terrorist activity” or “to a terrorist organization.”  Id. § 1182(3)(B)(iv)(VI). 
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(C) the organization’s terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security51 of the United States.52  In designating a 
foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary may consider classified 
information53 and must create an administrative record with supporting 
facts.54 
Designation results in dire consequences.  Funds that the designated 
organization has on deposit with any financial institution in the United 
States may be blocked in future transactions.55 Representatives and 
certain members of the organization are consequently barred from 
entering the United States.56  Most importantly, AEDPA § 2339B forbids 
all persons within or subject to U.S. jurisdiction from “knowingly 
 
Amended by the Patriot Act, the definition of “terrorist activity” now includes a 
“catch-all provision,” which defines such activity as the use of “any weapon or 
dangerous device,” not merely limited to those listed previously.  See Germain, supra 
note 26, at 518 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a)(1)(E), 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified 
at INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b))).  The only limitation on this definition “is that the use 
of the weapon must not be for ‘mere personal monetary gain’ and that the individual 
must have the ‘intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more 
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.’”  Id. (citing § 411 (codified at 
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI))). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (Supp. I 2001).  The statute defines the term “national 
security” as the “national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United 
States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2) (2000).  National security may be threatened not only 
domestically but also by “threats to U.S. nationals or U.S. interests abroad.”  Ellis, supra 
note 49, at 682 (footnote omitted). 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001).  The antiterrorism provisions of the 
AEDPA were designed to “provide the Federal Government the fullest possible basis, 
consistent with the Constitution, to prevent persons within the United States, or subject 
to the jurisdiction of the United States, from providing material support or resources to 
foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activities.”  Iraola, supra note 44, at 5–6 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B). 
 53. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(B) (Supp. I 2001).  Classified information may not be 
disclosed so long as it remains classified, but “such information may be disclosed to a 
court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review under Section 1189(b).”  Id.  
Section 1189(c)(1) provides that the term “classified information” “has the meaning given to 
that term in section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act,” which defines 
“classified information” as “any information or material that has been determined by the 
United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to 
require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security.”  
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1998) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3). 
 54. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 55. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C) (Supp. I 2001); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2) 
(2000).  The Secretary of the Treasury may freeze any assets that the organization has on 
deposit with any financial institution in the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C); see 
also 31 C.F.R. § 597.302 (2001) (defining assets); id. § 597.319(a) (defining “U.S. 
financial institution” in part as “[a]ny financial institution organized under the laws of 
the United States, including such financial institution’s foreign branches”).  These assets 
remain frozen “until further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury, Act of 
Congress, or order of court.”  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(C); see also 31 C.F.R. § 597.201(b). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
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provid[ing] material support or resources” to the organization.57  Under 
the AEDPA, the provider of material support has to know or have reason 
to know that any individual to which the contributor provided support 
has committed or planned to commit a terrorist activity, but this 
knowledge is not required when the provider donates to a terrorist 
organization.58  Violation results in a fine, may lead to imprisonment for 
up to fifteen years or longer if the violation results in “the death of any 
person,” or both.59 
Prior to filing a designation, the Secretary, by classified communication, 
must in writing notify several specified high ranking members of Congress 
of the intent to designate a certain entity as a foreign terrorist 
organization, together with supplying findings and the factual basis that 
support the designation.60  Seven days thereafter, the Secretary must 
publish the designation in the Federal Register.61  The designation is 
 
 57. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (Supp. I 2001).  The statute defines “material support or 
resources” as “currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial 
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation 
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials.”  Id. § 2339A(b).  It has been held that “two of the components 
included within the definition of material support, ‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were 
impermissibly vague,” thereby “enjoin[ing] the prosecution of [people] for activities 
covered by these terms.”  Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2000); see infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the viability of the AEDPA through the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine).  The term “expert advice or assistance” has also been held 
unconstitutionally vague.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC 
(MCx), 2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004). 
 58. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (Supp. I 2001) (amended by the Patriot Act 
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272).  The AEDPA did not originally 
make this distinction.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).  The current law now 
prohibits a contributor who provides material support to a terrorist organization, 
“regardless of whether [the provider] has knowledge that its members have committed or 
plan to commit a terrorist activity,” subject to two exceptions.  Germain, supra note 26, 
at 519 (citing Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(a), 115 Stat. 272 (codified at INA § 212(a)(3) 
(B)(iv)(VI))).  The first “applies if the provider gave to a group that has not been 
officially designated as a terrorist organization and if he can demonstrate that he did not 
know and should not reasonably have known that his act would further the 
organization’s terrorist activity.”  Id.  The second “applies if the Secretary of State and 
Attorney General, in their unreviewable discretion, determine that the clause should not 
apply.”  Id.  
 59. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (Supp. I 2001). 
 60. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i).  The congressional leaders to be notified are “the 
Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro 
tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the members of the 
relevant [congressional] committees.”  Id. 
 61. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
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effective for a period of two years62 and is only renewable by the 
Secretary, provided that the relevant circumstances that led to the initial 
designation still exist.63  Congress, however, may block or subsequently 
revoke a designation.64  The Secretary may also choose to revoke a 
designation depending on whether changed circumstances or the national 
security of the United States warrants such action.65  Nonetheless, the 
revocation of a designation does “not affect any action or proceeding 
based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such 
revocation.”66 
For the purposes of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, designation 
takes effect immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.67  
 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(A) (2000).  Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
have designated foreign terrorist organizations under the AEDPA scheme.  See Iraola, 
supra note 44, at 8.  Thirty organizations formed the first-ever set of designations, made 
by former Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright on October 2, 1997.  Id. (citing 
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 
1997)).  “On October 8, 1999, Secretary Albright redesignated twenty-seven groups, and 
added al-Qa’ida, the terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden” believed to be 
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.  Id. 
(citing Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112–13 
(Oct. 8, 1999) (designating “al Qaeda” for the first time)).  Secretary Albright designated 
one additional organization on September 25, 2000.  Id. (citing Designation of a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,641, 57,641–49 (Sept. 25, 2000) (designating the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan)). 
The Bush Administration has also been engaged in designating foreign terrorist 
organizations.  Secretary of State Colin L. Powell designated a new organization and 
renewed twenty-four others on October 5, 2001.  Id. (citing Redesignation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organization, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088, 51,088–90 (Oct. 5, 2001)).  Also “on 
December 26, 2001 and March 27, 2002, Secretary Powell designated five additional 
groups as terrorist organizations, including two Pakistani groups and a group linked to 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s party.”  Id. (citing Press Release, Colin L. Powell, 
Secretary of State, Statement on Designation of Three Additional Terrorist Organizations 
(Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/9017.htm).  As of 
May 23, 2003, thirty-six groups had been designated as foreign terrorist organizations, as 
indicated in a State Department fact sheet.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM, FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (May 23, 2003), available 
at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2003/12389.htm.  On October 2, 2003, twenty-five 
organizations were redesignated, including “al-Qa’ida.”  Redesignation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,860–02 (Oct. 2, 2003). 
 63. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B) (Supp. I 2001).  The Secretary may renew 
designation for an additional two-year period at the end of the two-year period referred 
to in § 1189(a)(4)(A), “but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination of such 
period.”  Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).  In addition, “[a]ny redesignation shall be effective 
immediately following the end of the prior [two]-year designation or redesignation 
period unless a different effective date is provided in such redesignation.”  Id. 
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(5) (2000). 
 65. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(6)(A)(i)–(ii) (Supp. I 2001). 
 66. Id. § 1189(a)(7). 
 67. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i).  Either designation or redesignation precludes a defendant in 
a criminal action from raising any question concerning the validity of the designation “as 
a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.”  Id. § 1189(a)(8). 
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Within thirty days, a designated organization may seek judicial review68 
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.69  Generally, the 
court must limit its review to the administrative record, yet in ex parte 
and in camera review, the court may also consider classified information 
used in making the designation.70 
On review, the D.C. Circuit must hold unlawful and set aside a 
designation that it finds to be: 
(A)  arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of 
statutory right; 
(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or 
in classified information submitted to the court . . . or 
(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.71 
B.  Major Constitutional Victories: The Rise of the AEDPA 
The great deference given to the Secretary and the fairly easy 
misinterpretation of certain provisions within the AEDPA raise a number of 
constitutional questions.72  For example, does the AEDPA violate the First 
Amendment?  Is it unconstitutionally vague?  What level of constitutional 
scrutiny should be applied?  What procedural due process concerns are 
affected by the Secretary’s designation of a foreign terrorist organization?  
And, are all of the Secretary’s findings in making the designation subject 
to judicial review?  The following section of this Comment will address 
possible answers to these questions and will track the AEDPA’s rise 
in constitutional validity, provided mostly by the Ninth Circuit in 
 
 68. The only function of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in reviewing an 
order of the Secretary designating an entity as a foreign terrorist organization under the 
AEDPA “is to decide if the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information . . . 
to come to the conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism.”  
Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 25 (D.C. Cir. 
1999)).  Furthermore, there is no greater function for the appellate court in reviewing a 
Secretary’s designation of one such organization as an alias of another.  Id. 
 69. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000); see infra Part IV.C. 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(2). 
 71. Id. § 1189(b)(3).  The pendency of an action for judicial review does not alter 
the effectiveness of the designation, “unless the court issues a final order setting aside 
the designation.”  Id. § 1189(b)(4). 
 72. For a more extensive discussion on answers to similar questions, see Iraola, 
supra note 44, at 5–22. 
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Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno.73 
1.  Under the First Amendment: Guilt by Association 
The First Amendment provides the following: 
   Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.74 
Although the word “association” does not appear in the First Amendment, 
freedom of association arises by implication.  The Supreme Court has 
held that the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of 
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces 
freedom of speech.”75  Accordingly, opponents claim that the AEDPA 
 
 73. 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).  The following discussion will not, however, 
analyze the recent indictments of the following individuals under the AEDPA: (1) 
Former University of South Florida computer engineering professor Sami Al-Arian, who 
was indicted on February 19, 2003, with three other men, for helping to finance suicide 
bombings and other attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Israel.  George C. Harris, 
Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National 
Security, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 135, 146 n.65 (2003) (book review).  For the June 2003 
decision on the defendants’ various pretrial motions, see United States v. Al-Arian, 267 
F. Supp. 2d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2003).  (2) Earnest James Ujaama, who was indicted in 
August 2002 in a Washington federal court for providing material support and resources 
to al Qaeda and conspiring to establish a terrorist training camp in rural Oregon.  See 
Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial Response to 
the Government’s War on Terror, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 799 n.38 (2003); 
see also Anti-Defamation League, Convictions/Sentencing, TERRORISM UPDATE, July 
2003, at 3 (reporting that Ujaama pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a two-year prison 
term on April 14, 2003), available at http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/terrorism_update_ 
32_july2003.pdf.  (3) Enaam M. Arnaout, head of the Benevolence International 
Foundation, a purportedly international charitable organization, was indicted in 2002 for 
providing funds to al Qaeda, Hezb e Islami, Chechen rebels at war with the Russian 
army, and other groups involved in violent activities in Chechnya.  Associated Press, 
Islamic Charity Head Charged With Funneling Funds to Bin Laden, FOXNEWS.COM 
(Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,65252,00.html.  On the morning 
of his trial, Arnaout entered a guilty plea to a charge of racketeering fraud conspiracy, 
and in exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the material support charge.  United 
States v. Arnaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 74. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 75. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations 
omitted) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more 
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of 
speech and assembly.”).  In other words, “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, 
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously 
protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group 
effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 622 (1984) (citation omitted). 
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prohibits individuals from participating in organizations that assist or 
support terrorism without explicitly examining the individuals’ purpose 
in such involvement, thereby incriminating those who may be supporting 
the legal activities of such designated organizations.76  As a result, 
criminal defendants have recently attacked the AEDPA on First Amendment 
freedom of association grounds, but have not been successful.77 
In particular, the district court in United States v. Lindh78 rejected such 
a challenge.  The defendant, an American citizen, contested a ten count 
indictment filed against him under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B79 in February  
2002 for allegedly joining “certain foreign terrorist organizations in 
Afghanistan and serv[ing] these organizations [overseas while] in 
combat against Northern Alliance and American forces until his capture 
 
 76. Gross, supra note 44, at 17.  Opponents criticize the AEDPA for impeding the 
right to financially support one’s chosen group, claiming this violates the essential right 
to associate.  See, e.g., Whidden, supra note 12, at 2845 (citing David Cole, Hanging 
with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 203, 246–50). 
 77. Iraola, supra note 44, at 16. 
 78. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002).  Defendant John Philip Walker Lindh, 
the so-called “American Taliban” fighter, moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground 
that the prejudicial media attention surrounding his case deprived him of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, a request later denied by the court.  Id. at 547–51.  Lindh 
was subsequently sentenced to twenty years in federal prison, see Susan Candiotti, 
Walker Lindh Sentenced to 20 Years, CNN.COM (Oct. 4, 2002), at http://www. 
CNN.com/2002/LAW/10/04/lindh.statement/index.html, and attacked by a fellow inmate.  
See John Walker Lindh Attacked in Prison, CNN.COM (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www. 
CNN.com/2003/US/West/03/06/walker.lindh.prison/index.html.  Due to the sentencing, 
one commentator proclaimed the following: 
   So discount the assertions of the naysayers, the pessimists, and the fearful, 
that the United States government lacks the resources to deal with people 
within our jurisdiction who engage in active or sleeper terrorist activities.  
Sections 391 [the federal conspiracy statute] and 2339 are more than up to the 
challenge.  Rest assured that, thanks to these two statutes, accused domestic 
terrorists will fall like tenpins. 
Henry Mark Holzer, Terrorists’ Nemesis, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM (Sept. 26, 2002), at 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=3381. 
 79. Counts two through five had § 2339B implications, charging Lindh with 
conspiracy to provide and providing material support and resources to designated foreign 
terrorist organizations, namely the Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) (counts two and 
three), a terrorist group dedicated to an extremist view in Islam, and al Qaeda (counts 
four and five).  Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 547; see also Executive Order 13224: Blocking 
Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, 
or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079–83 (Sept. 23, 2001) (listing HUM as 
an organization whose “property and interests in property . . . that are in the United 
States . . . are blocked”). 
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in November 2001.”80  The defendant argued that he had a right to associate 
with foreign individuals and groups and that the indictment impermissibly 
infringed this right by criminalizing his relationship, resulting in the 
government’s imposition of guilt by association.81 
The court deemed the argument unfounded, especially because the 
defendant crossed the line between First Amendment-protected activities 
and constitutionally unprotected criminal conduct.82 In this instance, the 
defendant was accused not only of associating with disfavored groups, 
but also of joining groups that did more than “merely advocate terror, 
violence, and murder of innocents”; these groups actually carried out 
their campaigns.83  Therefore, individuals who actively take part in a 
terrorist organization’s acts of terror, violence, and murder, at whatever 
level, carry out crimes with no constitutional protection.84  Challenges by 
these participants are thus struck down.85 
The court in Lindh cited its strongest authority in Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno,86 where the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected a similar notion.87  
Plaintiffs, comprised of six organizations and two U.S. citizens,88 claimed 
 
 80. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 545.  The indictment specifically alleged that the 
defendant (1) attended a military training camp in Pakistan run by HUM; (2) crossed 
from Pakistan into Afghanistan for the purpose of taking up arms with the Taliban; (3) 
reported to a Taliban recruiting center in Kabul; (4) attended al Qaeda’s al-Farooq 
training camp for military training and personally met with al Qaeda leader Osama bin 
Laden; (5) participated in a terrorist training course; (6) completed his training and was 
subsequently issued rifles and grenades; (7) traveled with other combatants to the front 
line in Takhar (in northeastern Afghanistan) where he opposed Northern Alliance forces; 
(8) remained with his fighting group after the United States had entered the conflict and 
until the defendant surrendered at Kunduz, Afghanistan; and (9) was among a group of 
Taliban prisoners who staged a violent uprising at the Qala-i-Janghi (QIJ) prison that 
resulted in the death of an American intelligence agent.  Id. at 545–47. 
 81. Id. at 569. 
 82. Id.  The court summarized the point as follows: “The First Amendment’s 
guarantee of associational freedom is no license to supply terrorist organizations with 
resources or material support in any form, including services as a combatant.  Those who 
choose to furnish such material support to terrorists cannot hide or shield their conduct 
behind the First Amendment.”  Id. at 570. 
 83. Id. at 569. 
 84. Id. 
 85. This statement “finds support in long-standing Supreme Court precedent 
upholding the government’s authority to place restrictions or outright bans on dealings 
with foreign entities that have acted against United States interests.”  Id. at 570.  For 
example, the Supreme Court has upheld a prohibition on dealings with Cuba, further 
holding: “Matters relating ‘to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so exclusively 
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial 
inquiry or interference.’”  Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (quoting Harisiades 
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)) (alteration in original). 
 86. 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 87. Id. at 1133.  The court further noted that § 2339B “has teeth” because a 
violation leads to punishment by fine, imprisonment, or both.  Id. at 1132. 
 88. Id. at 1133.  Named plaintiffs included six organizations—the Humanitarian 
Law Project, Ilankai Thamil Sangam, Tamils of Northern California, Tamil Welfare and 
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that the AEDPA prohibition violated the long-established rule as set 
forth in cases such as NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.89  In order for 
liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, the rule deems it 
“necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and 
that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims.”90  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project argued that 
criminalizing their support of two nonviolent humanitarian and political 
organizations91 infringed upon their rights of association.92 
 
Human Rights Committee, Federation of Tamil Sangams of North America, World 
Tamil Coordinating Committee—and two United States citizens—Ralph Fertig and 
Nagalingam Jeyalingam.  Id. at 1130.  The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the 
suit against named defendants Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright, Attorney General 
Janet Reno, and the U.S. Departments of Justice and State.  Id.; see also Joseph Furst, 
III, Comment, Guilt by Association and the AEDPA’s Fundraising Ban, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. HUM. RTS. 475, 486 (1999). 
 89. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).  In Claiborne Hardware, ninety-two petitioners were 
found liable for economic damages incurred as a result of a boycott of the respondents’ 
businesses, owned by white merchants in Claiborne City, Mississippi.  Id. at 888–93.  
The judgment was reversed on appeal because the majority of the petitioners’ activities 
were nonviolent and entitled to protection under the First Amendment, but the Supreme 
Court observed that those who took part in an unlawful activity and had further violent 
goals could nevertheless be held liable.  Id. at 933–34.  The Court held: “The right to 
associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of the 
group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that itself is not 
protected.”  Id. at 908.  Thus, absent a showing of specific intent to further unlawful 
conduct, the Court concluded that mere association by the petitioners with the boycotting 
group was insufficient to predicate liability.  Id. at 920. 
 90. Id. (footnote omitted).  Furthermore, to punish association with a group having 
both legal and illegal aims, “there must be ‘clear proof that a defendant “specifically 
intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.”’”  Id. at 919 
(citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) and quoting Noto v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)).  The government has the burden to establish both the 
defendant’s affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful claims and goals and the 
defendant’s specific intent to further illegal aims.  Id. at 919–20 (citing Healy v. James, 
408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972)); see also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) 
(rejecting an Arizona statute that provided for “guilt by association” and punished 
membership in the Communist Party or of any other organization that included the 
overthrow of the Arizona state government as one of its purposes). 
 91. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (also known as the Partiya Karkeran 
Kurdistan) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (also known as the Tamil 
Tigers and the Ellalan Force) were designated as foreign terrorist organizations on 
October 8, 1997.  Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997)).  The plaintiffs claimed 
that they were prevented from providing support to the PKK and the LTTE out of fear of 
criminal sanctions.  Id. at 1182.  The plaintiffs’ main argument centered around the 
AEDPA not requiring “specific intent” to further the illegal aims of the PKK and LTTE 
before a criminal violation arises, thus imposing guilt by association and infringing upon 
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The rule expressed in Claiborne Hardware and similar cases, 
however, is applicable only in situations where people are punished “by 
reason of association alone.”93  Conversely, the AEDPA does not necessarily 
prohibit participating as a member in a designated group, supporting or 
promoting the political goals of a designated group, or praising designated 
groups for using terrorism to achieve certain political ends.94  Rather, the 
AEDPA punishes the act of giving material support, including giving 
organizations weapons and explosives to further their terrorist missions.95 
In a major triumph, the AEDPA’s prohibitions were held not to 
impose guilt by association, prompting the Ninth Circuit to affirm the 
judgment of the district court.96  The court further bolstered the AEDPA’s 
strength by refusing to require that the government demonstrate a 
donor’s specific intent in aiding an organization’s illegal activities 
before ascribing liability to the donation of funds.97  Material support, 
 
plaintiffs’ protected free speech.  Id. at 1185. 
 92. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133.  The plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief barring enforcement of the AEDPA against them.  Id.  The United States District 
Court for the Central District of California (Justice Audrey B. Collins presiding) denied 
the injunction due to the plaintiffs’ associational challenge, but enjoined enforcement on 
vagueness grounds.  Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1204; see also infra 
Part III.B.3. 
 93. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 
458 U.S. at 920).  “[B]y reason of association alone” means merely participating in a 
group or “espousing its views.”  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  The AEDPA additionally prohibits providing resources with which terrorist 
organizations may purchase weapons, explosives, and other military artillery.  Id. 
 96. Id. at 1138; see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. & Holy Land Found. for 
Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1015, 1027–28 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the AEDPA 
does not violate the First Amendment right of free association and that the government’s 
interest in preventing terrorism was sufficient to alter a statute that incriminated acts of 
international terrorism and to apply it to a civil cause of action by injured plaintiffs).  In 
Boim, the plaintiffs filed a civil suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against several nonprofit 
entities accused of soliciting and laundering funds to finance a designated terrorist 
organization whose members murdered the plaintiffs’ son.  Id. at 1001–04.  Section 2333 
gives U.S. nationals and their survivors the right to sue in U.S. district courts for 
damages incurred “by reason of an act of international terrorism.”  18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 
(2000) (enacted as Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 
1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4521 (entitled “Terrorism Civil Remedy”)).  The court in Boim 
upheld the theory that the definition of terrorism as an activity “involv[ing] violent acts,” 
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A), allows plaintiffs to raise claims against not only 
those who engage in violent terrorist activity, but also those who aid and abet such acts.  
Boim, 291 F.3d at 1015.  This tort framework, which requires knowledge, intent, and 
causation, protects § 2333 from claims of unconstitutionality because it punishes not 
merely association, as the court in Claiborne Hardware condemns, but also the material 
support of illegal activity that is left unprotected by the Constitution.  Id. at 1026–27.  
This opens the door to a new class of litigants alleging aiding and abetting rather than 
“close involvement in violent terrorist activities.”  Recent Case, Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (2002). 
 97. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133–34.  The court distinguished 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1063 (9th Cir. 1995) 
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therefore, currently entails the promotion of an organization’s unlawful 
activities, irrespective of a sponsor’s intent.98 
2.  Under the First Amendment: Political Advocacy and the             
Question of Scrutiny 
The plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project, in addition to making the 
argument that the AEDPA’s antiterrorist provisions violated their 
respective freedom of association rights,99 contended that both terrorist 
organizations at issue engaged in political advocacy.100  Citing Buckley 
v. Valeo,101 the plaintiffs argued that because “providing money to 
organizations engaged in political expression is itself both political 
expression and association,” they had not infringed the AEDPA.102 
The court centered this debate on Americans’ right to associate with 
foreign political groups through donations103 and determined that past 
cases that likened monetary support to political expression “involved 
organizations whose overwhelming function was political advocacy.”104  
 
(requiring the government to establish a terrorist organization advocate’s “knowing 
affiliation” and a “specific intent to further those illegal claims”) (citation omitted), 
because “advocacy is far different from making donations of material support.”  
Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1133–34. 
 98. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134.  Opponents of the AEDPA 
suggest that the federal government amend the Act and follow an antiterrorist funding 
statute enacted by the Illinois legislature.  See, e.g., Furst, supra note 88, at 500 (citing 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-5, 10, 15 (1999)).  Unlike the AEDPA, the Illinois statute 
requires a showing of a donor’s specific intent to fund an act of international terrorism.  
Id.  Although this requirement appears reasonable, it weakens law enforcement.  
Hypothetically, if a sponsor donates money to an organization lacking the intent to fund 
terrorism, the Illinois statute would prohibit the United States from blocking or 
criminalizing this action, even though the organization may nonetheless use that money 
for terrorist purposes.  See id.  The AEDPA’s primary purpose is to eliminate funds to 
designated entities.  The donor’s intent is irrelevant. 
 99. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 100. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134. 
 101. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  In Buckley, the Supreme Court established that attempts to 
regulate financial campaign contributions pursuant to the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971 are so closely related to and necessary for political expression so as to fall under 
the First Amendment protection of free expression.  Id. at 14. 
 102. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134; see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44–45 
(“[T]he constitutionality of [the restrictions on contributions to political candidates] turns 
on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting 
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.”). 
 103. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134 n.1. 
 104. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).  The court labeled Buckley as the “quintessential 
example where the contributions were made to candidates for political office for the 
purpose of helping them engage in electioneering.”  Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–
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While the First Amendment protects contributions to support U.S. 
political advocacy, the Constitution does not protect the political advocacy 
of foreign terrorist organizations within their own governments, which 
was the case here.105  Moreover, the First Amendment protects the expressive 
component of seeking and donating funds as pure speech, but not 
expressive conduct.106  In other words, the government may choose to 
regulate contributions not only to organizations that engage in unlawful 
or harmful activities, but also to organizations that engage in lawful, but 
not speech-related, activities.107 
In addition, in allowing the legislature more leeway, § 2339B does not 
merit strict scrutiny108 because the provision “is not aimed at interfering 
with the expressive component of [the plaintiffs’] conduct but at 
stopping aid to terrorist groups.”109  Rather, proper review falls under the 
 
13).  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 specifically restricted political 
contributions and expenditures applied to all phases and all participants of the election 
process.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12–13. 
 105. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134 n.1 (citing United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that Fourth Amendment constitutional 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure could not be extended to a Mexican 
citizen with no voluntary attachment to the United States)). 
 106. Id. at 1134–35. 
 107. Id. at 1135 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government 
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the 
written or spoken word.”).  The issue is “not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the 
expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a 
restriction on that expression is valid.”  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406–07. 
 108. Constitutional review is comprised of three main standards: (1) In order to 
satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, the “most rigorous and exacting standard of 
constitutional review,” a statute must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest” and must be the least restrictive effective means of doing so.  See Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).  Statutes based on racial classifications trigger the 
strict scrutiny standard.  See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (applying 
strict scrutiny to voting districts drawn with race as the predominant factor).  (2) In order 
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a more lenient level of scrutiny typically applied to 
gender-based classifications, “the legislation must be substantially related to advancing 
important or substantial governmental interests, and not be substantially more 
burdensome than necessary to advance these interests.”  R. Randall Kelso, Standards of 
Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines 
Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern Supreme Court 
Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 228 (2002) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1, at 529 (1997) (noting that 
“[i]ntermediate scrutiny is used for discrimination based on gender”)).  (3) Under the 
minimal rationality review, “the legislation only has to be rationally related to legitimate 
governmental interests, and not impose irrational burdens on individuals.”  Id. (citing 
CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 9.1, at 529).  The standard of review a court implements depends 
on “a myriad of factors that counsel [a court] either to defer to legislative judgment, in 
which case rational review is employed, or counsel [a court] to be suspicious of the 
legislative action, in which case some form of heightened scrutiny is applied.”  Id. at 
228–29 (footnotes omitted). 
 109. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135.  Compare United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a statutory 
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intermediate scrutiny standard, which applies when “a regulation . . . 
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression.”110  In applying 
this standard, the court makes four inquiries: (1) “Is the regulation” at 
issue within the constitutional “power of the government?”  (2) Does the 
regulation “promote an important or substantial government interest?”  
(3) Is the promoted interest “unrelated to suppressing free expression?”  
(4) “[I]s the incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms no 
greater than necessary?”111 
The court in Humanitarian Law Project swiftly answered each of the 
first three questions in the affirmative.112  The fourth question turned on 
whether the AEDPA was tailored enough to accomplish its purpose of 
“preventing the United States from being used as a base for terrorist 
fundraising.”113  Because such a determination depends significantly on 
foreign policy considerations, courts must allow political branches “wide 
latitude in selecting the means to bring about the desired goal.”114  This 
 
regulation that prohibited the burning of a draft card because the statute condemned only 
the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach), with Johnson, 
491 U.S. at 406 (applying strict scrutiny to law that prohibited the burning of flags that 
offended witnesses because the law restricted the content of the message that flag 
burning conveys). 
 110. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (alteration in original) (applying intermediate review 
to a regulation that required concert performers to use the city’s sound amplification 
equipment and sound technician in order for the city to regulate the volume of music 
coming from the stage in the city’s park).  The regulation pursuant to the AEDPA prohibits 
aid to terrorist groups, not the freedom of expression.  See Humanitarian Law Project, 
supra. 
 111. Id. at 1135; see also O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
 112. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1135.  (1) As to whether the federal 
government had the power to regulate aid to terrorist organizations, the court held that it 
clearly did through the power to enact laws restricting transactions between U.S. citizens 
with foreign entities.  Id.  (2) As to whether the regulation promotes an important or 
substantial government interest, the court identified such an interest in preventing the 
spread of international terrorism.  Id. (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) 
(“Protection of the foreign policy of the United States is a governmental interest of great 
importance, since foreign policy and national security considerations cannot neatly be 
compartmentalized.”)).  (3) The court found it true that this substantial interest is 
unrelated to suppressing free expression because the government “restricts the actions of 
those who wish to give material support to the groups, not the expression of those who 
advocate or believe the ideas that the groups supports.”  Id. 
 113. Id. at 1136. 
 114. Id.  The plaintiffs additionally argued that the statutory scheme prior to the 
amendments implemented by the AEDPA in 1996, see 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994), 
which allowed individuals to donate humanitarian assistance to those who were not 
directly involved in terrorist activity, had an acceptable scope and that the current 
AEDPA scheme is overbroad.  Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136.  The court 
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latitude is sufficient enough so that the government need not employ the 
least restrictive or least intrusive means to safeguard against terrorism.115 
Consequently, the government’s decisions as to whether donations to 
foreign terrorist organizations amount to material support are not met 
with heavy skepticism.116  One reason for this is that Congress possesses 
the factfinding resources necessary to make such conclusions properly.117  
Largely due to this deference to legislative decisionmaking, the judiciary 
has not found that the AEDPA restricts First Amendment freedoms to a 
greater degree than necessary.118 
3.  Under the First Amendment: Vagueness 
A final challenge presented by the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law 
 
deflected this argument and acted on its presumption that Congress had a good reason to 
expand the scope of the scheme’s antiterrorist provisions.  Id. 
 115. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 798).  
Rather, the intermediate scrutiny standard of review is satisfied so long as the AEDPA’s 
antifundraising provisions promote a substantial governmental interest that would be 
achieved less effectively had the AEDPA failed to exist.  See United States v. Albertini, 
472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985). 
 116. This deference to the government led to the rejection of an additional argument 
asserted by the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project.  Relying on Forsyth County v. 
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), and Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), two cases holding certain 
licensing schemes unconstitutional because they granted government officials 
“unfettered discretion” to regulate First Amendment activity, the plaintiffs argued that 
the AEDPA violated the First Amendment by “giving the Secretary ‘unfettered 
discretion’ to limit their right to associate with certain foreign organizations, and by 
insulating [the Secretary’s] decisions from judicial review.”  Humanitarian Law Project, 
205 F.3d at 1136.  The Ninth Circuit provided more proof of the AEDPA’s strength, 
distinguishing Forsyth and Gaudiya Vaishnava by noting that the regulations contained 
in both cases encompassed First Amendment-protected activities over which government 
officials enjoyed the pure discretion to regulate.  Id.  (The protected activities were parades in 
Forsyth and the sale of merchandise carrying political, religious, philosophical, or 
ideological messages in Gaudiya Vaishnava.)  In contrast, the AEDPA does not 
prescribe such empowerment; it fails to strictly scrutinize free speech or association per 
se, focusing more on restricting expressive conduct, or the act of giving material support 
to designated foreign organizations.  Id. at 1136–37.  Logically, the AEDPA does not 
grant the Secretary unfettered discretion to render haphazard designations because the 
Secretary may only designate groups that explicitly engage in terrorist activities, as 
defined by statute, thus eliminating the likelihood that the International Red Cross or the 
International Olympic Committee can ever be designated.  Id. at 1137.  In a sign of trust, 
the court held that the AEDPA is not so trivial as to categorize the Secretary’s authority 
as “unfettered discretion,” especially because the statute requires the Secretary’s grounds 
for designation to be reasonable.  See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)). 
 117. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1136 (stating that the court “will not 
indulge in speculation about whether Congress was right to come to the conclusion that it 
did”).  In addition, the executive branch in designating foreign terrorist organizations 
receives more latitude from the judiciary in regulating foreign affairs than domestic 
conduct.  Id. at 1137. 
 118. Id. at 1136. 
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Project accused the AEDPA of being impermissibly vague under the 
First Amendment.119  Under the vagueness doctrine, a law that does not 
fairly inform a person “of ordinary intelligence” of what is commanded 
or prohibited is unconstitutional as violating due process.120  Assuming 
that persons are free to choose between lawful and unlawful conduct, the 
doctrine “insist[s] that laws give [persons] of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that [persons] may 
act accordingly.”121  Moreover, in order to prevent arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement, it is crucial that laws provide “explicit 
standards” for those who enforce them.122  For the AEDPA to survive a 
vagueness challenge, it must define the “offense with sufficient 
definiteness [so] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited.”123 
 
 119. Id. at 1137. 
 120. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (determining the 
vagueness of an antinoise ordinance that prohibited the noise or diversion adjacent to any 
building in which a school or class was in session).  The type of statute involved may 
determine the amount of vagueness that the Constitution will permit.  Vill. of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).  For example, 
economic regulations are subject to a more lenient vagueness test because its provisions 
are often more narrow than, for example, a case involving the First Amendment.  Id.; see 
also United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (considering the 
vagueness of the Robinson-Patman Act, a statute that incriminated the sale of goods at 
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying the competition, not only on its 
face, but also as applied to the facts of the case). 
 121. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 
U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (noting that when people are required to live under a rule of law, 
they “are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids”) (quoting 
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)) (citations omitted)). 
 122. Id. at 108; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).  In Kolender, 
the petitioner challenged a California statute that required persons who loiter or wander 
to provide proof of “credible and reliable” identification when requested by a peace 
officer.  Id. at 353.  The California Court of Appeal defined “credible and reliable” 
identification as identification “carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is 
authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has 
identified himself.”  Id. at 357 (quoting People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (Ct. 
App. 1973)).  Because the statute contained no standard for an individual to determine 
what he or she could do to provide reliable and credible identification, it gave complete 
discretion to the police in determining if the individual had met the requirements of the 
statute.  Id. at 358.  The Supreme Court held that because the statute encouraged 
arbitrary enforcement by not providing with sufficient particularity what an individual 
must do to comply with the law, the statute was unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 361. 
 123. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.  The Supreme Court typically upholds statutes 
in the face of vagueness challenges if statutory language includes words having well-
known technical or special meanings or settled common law meanings, or if the text or 
subject matter of the statute affords some type of standard.  Connally v. Gen. Constr. 
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In particular, the plaintiffs in Humanitarian Law Project alleged that 
the terms “foreign terrorist organization” and “material support,” as 
defined by the AEDPA, violated the vagueness doctrine.124  The district 
court partially agreed, finding that two items “within the definition of 
material support, ‘training’ and ‘personnel,’ were impermissibly vague,” 
thereby issuing a limited preliminary injunction enjoining “the 
prosecution of any of the plaintiffs’ members for activities covered by 
these terms.”125 
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit found that the term “personnel” 
blurred the line between First Amendment-protected expression and 
unprotected conduct, thus creating an element of uncertainty regarding 
 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1926).  In Connally, the plaintiff brought suit to enjoin 
officers from enforcing an Oklahoma statute providing that “not less than the current rate 
of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed” shall be paid to laborers 
on the basis that it was unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 393.  The Court held that the 
statute was fatally uncertain because “the words ‘current rate of wages’ do not denote a 
specific or definite sum, but minimum, maximum and intermediate amounts, 
indeterminately, varying from time to time and dependent upon the class and kind of 
work done, the efficiency of the workmen, etc.”  Id. at 393.  Although statutes must 
define offenses with reasonable certainty, this does not mean that statutes cannot use 
terms that are adequately interpreted by “common usage and understanding.”  Boyce 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1952) (quoting Sproles v. 
Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 393 (1932)) (upholding a statute as not unconstitutionally vague 
because the statute was a product of a long history of regulation in which terms were 
commonly understood). 
 124. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137.  The term “material support or 
resources,” prior to the 2001 amendment by the Patriot Act, meant “currency or other 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation 
or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or 
religious materials.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (2000) (emphasis added).  The Patriot Act 
amended the definition so that the phrase “or monetary instruments or financial 
securities” replaced “or other financial securities,” and the term “expert advice or 
assistance” was added.  See Patriot Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 805(a)(2), 115 
Stat. 272, 377 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  However, the 
term “expert advice or assistance” has been held unconstitutionally vague.  Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx), 2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 17, 2004).  The term “foreign terrorist organization” is defined as “an 
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act.”  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6).  Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189, section 
219 of the INA, before being amended by the Patriot Act, originally designated an 
organization as a foreign terrorist organization if: 
(A)  the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity [or terrorism or retains the 
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism]; and 
(C)  the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United 
States nationals or the national security of the Unites States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2000), amended by Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 
tit. IV, § 411(c), 115 Stat. 272, 349 (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–
(C) (Supp. I 2001)). 
 125. Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137. 
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the scope of the AEDPA.126  For example, pure speech protected by the 
First Amendment, such as advocacy, may be construed as supplying 
personnel, especially when resources normally reserved for simply 
advocating a foreign terrorist group are instead used to actively engage 
in terrorist activities.127  Likewise, the court held that the term “training” 
may also be construed to prohibit otherwise protected acts.  For example, 
instructing members of a designated organization on how to petition the 
United Nations for aid and relief has little to do with donating to or 
engaging in military training or training in terrorist activities, but may 
nonetheless fall within the scope of the term “training.”128 
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs established meritorious vagueness 
claims with respect to both personnel and training, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in issuing its 
limited preliminary injunction and enjoining the plaintiffs’ prosecution in 
the process.129 
The vagueness challenge in Humanitarian Law Project may have 
yielded some success, but subsequent challenges based on vagueness in 
both United States v. Lindh130 and United States v. Goba131 fell on deaf ears, 
thereby strengthening the AEDPA’s already vast constitutional scope.  
In Lindh, the defendant relied on Humanitarian Law Project in making 
the case that section 2339B was unconstitutionally vague.132  The court 
rejected this argument and disregarded the Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Humanitarian Law Project as being neither persuasive nor controlling, 
noting that the plain meaning of “personnel” indicated exactly what the 
term “personnel” typically purports: an employment or employment-like 
relationship between the persons in question, and in this context, terrorist 
organizations.133  The court further held that the term “personnel” is 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  The government suggested that in order to keep the AEDPA from 
overreaching on constitutionally-protected advocacy and other forms of free speech, the 
court read into the statute a requirement that the activities prohibited be performed 
“under the direction or control” of the foreign terrorist organization.  The court declined, 
due to lack of authority, to rewrite the law so as to survive constitutional scrutiny.  Id. at 
1137–38. 
 128. Id. at 1138. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002); see also supra note 78 and accompanying 
text. 
 131. 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 132. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
 133. Id. at 574. 
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unequivocally “aimed at denying the provision of human resources to 
proscribed terrorist organizations, and not at the mere independent 
advocacy of an organization’s interests or agenda” and that the term 
gives “fair notice to the public of what is prohibited.”134  Thus, the court 
found the term “personnel” to be sufficiently clear to defeat a void for 
vagueness challenge. 
Similarly, the court in Goba rejected a vagueness challenge when applied 
to defendants accused of training at a known terrorist organization’s 
camp.135  The court acknowledged that one can unambiguously provide 
“material support or resources” by offering services to a terrorist 
organization and by allowing oneself to become “indoctrinated and 
trained as a ‘resource’ in that organization’s beliefs and activities.”136  
The court responded to the defendants’ reliance on Humanitarian Law 
Project, a civil case wherein the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for 
fear that their legitimate humanitarian activities would be criminalized 
by the AEDPA, by citing Lindh, an analogous criminal indictment.137  
The court in Goba quoted Lindh for the proposition that the statute was 
not unconstitutional: 
[Defendant] Lindh contends his conduct does not, as a matter of law, amount to 
providing “material support and resources,” including “training” and 
“personnel,” because he provided no training and that merely enlisting in an 
armed force—rather than recruiting for such a force—does not constitute 
providing personnel.  Lindh is incorrect on both arguments. 
   Thus, to provide personnel is to provide people who become affiliated with 
the organization and work under its direction: the individual or individuals 
provided could be the provider himself, or others, or both.138 
Consistent with Lindh and Humanitarian Law Project, in Goba, § 2339B 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194.  In Goba, the magistrate found that all six 
defendants, also known as the “Buffalo Six,” had traveled to Pakistan in 2001 in two 
separate groups and “attended a training camp . . . in Afghanistan at which Usama bin 
Laden spoke espousing anti-American sentiment and received training in the use of 
weapons and lectures on suicide as a means of causing harm to the enemy.”  Id. at 192; 
see United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Andrew 
Cohen, Buffalo Six’s Day in Court, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 9, 2002), at http://www. 
cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/09/news/opinion/courtwatch/main524967.shtml.  After several 
weeks, the defendants returned to Lackawanna, New York, where they “resumed their 
regular lives until their arrests on or about September 13, 2002.”  Goba, 240 F. Supp. at 
244–45 (denying the defendants’ motions for revocation of the magistrate’s detention 
order).  On December 3, 2003, the first member of the group, twenty-three-year-old 
Mukhtar al-Bakri, was sentenced to ten years in prison after pleading guilty to providing 
material support under § 2339B.  Al Qaeda Trainee Gets 10-Year Sentence, CNN.com/ 
LAW CENTER (Dec. 3, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/LAW/12/03/buffalo.six. 
 136. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (recognizing that this principle is offered by the 
district judge in Lindh). 
 137. Id. at 193. 
 138. Id. at 194 (quoting Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 577). 
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once again overcame a constitutional challenge, thereby completing the 
string of victories.139 
IV.  HITTING A BRICK WALL: THE FALL OF THE AEDPA 
Fresh off a major victory in March 2000,140 the AEDPA’s antifundraising 
provision seemed constitutionally insurmountable.  Section 2339B fought 
off allegations that it wrongfully deprived individuals of their 
associational rights.141  It dodged the dreaded strict scrutiny standard.142  
Its defenders convinced courts to uphold contested terms in the face of 
vagueness challenges.143  Finally, it preserved the government’s right to 
criminalize the donation of material resources to designated terrorist 
organizations without inspecting a donor’s intent.144  Moreover, it paved 
the way for the Patriot Act despite critics’ screams that it shreds the 
 
 139. In summarizing the rise in the AEDPA, one scholar put it best: 
   Notwithstanding the concern raised by some commentators that the anti-
funding provisions of the AEDPA violate the First Amendment’s guarantees of 
free speech and association, the only court that has squarely confronted this 
issue has found otherwise.  In light of the recent attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, and the favorable case law, it would be surprising if 
the government did not become more aggressive in its enforcement of the anti-
funding provisions of the AEDPA. 
Iraola, supra note 44, at 20 (footnotes omitted) (citing to Humanitarian Law Project as 
the “only court”). 
 140. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 141. See supra Part III.B.1.  Prior to Humanitarian Law Project, opponents boldly, 
yet erroneously, stated the following: 
The AEDPA ban not only unconstitutionally burdens free speech, but it also 
impinges on the right of association.  Under the Act, individuals are forced to 
choose between going to jail or not contributing to a designated foreign 
organization, even though they may only want to support the legal aims of the 
group. 
See, e.g., Beall, supra note 45, at 703–04 (footnote omitted). 
 142. See supra Part III.B.2.  Opponents likewise declared the following: “The 
AEDPA’s complete ban on speech in the form of contributions to particular groups 
certainly would not satisfy strict scrutiny.  As the name implies, strict scrutiny is a 
difficult test for the government to overcome.”  Beall, supra note 45, at 700 (footnote 
omitted).  Opponents also recognized that AEDPA proponents might argue that the Act 
“regulates conduct and not speech.”  Id. at 702.  In that case, opponents acknowledged 
that the intermediate scrutiny standard of United States v. O’Brien would apply but 
maintained that the AEDPA fundraising ban would still fail because the governmental 
interest was not “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  
As it turned out, the court in Humanitarian Law Project held exactly the opposite.  See 
supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 144. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 




With little luck in overthrowing the antifundraising provision, opponents 
turned to the AEDPA’s other facet, section 1189, which describes the 
procedure by which the Secretary designates an entity as a foreign 
terrorist organization.146  Primarily, organizations complained that the 
AEDPA’s designation procedure violated Fifth Amendment Due Process, 
which guarantees the following: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”147  The Supreme 
Court has held that, while the procedural protections required by the Due 
Process Clause do not have “a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances,”148 fundamental procedural due process nonetheless 
requires the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”149  Because the AEDPA does not require the Secretary 
to provide either notice or the opportunity for a hearing to entities 
regarding impending designation, opponents have questioned the 
validity of section 1189.150 
In the first significant case to address a due process challenge against 
section 1189,151 the D.C. Circuit in People’s Mojahedin Organization of 
Iran v. Department of State (People’s Mojahedin)152 held that foreign 
 
 145. See, e.g., Van Bergen, supra note 28.  In Van Bergen’s opinion: “The USA 
Patriot Act is an insult to Americans.  The name, itself, is insulting, given what the Act 
contains and what it will someday be known for: its complete abdication of democratic 
law and principles.  It should be called the Constitution Shredding Act.”  Id.  In response 
to such condemnation, Attorney General John Ashcroft called this criticism a “bold 
declaration[] of so-called fact” that has dissolved into “vague conjecture” in light of the 
U.S. Justice Department’s excruciating attention to detail in its terrorism prevention 
strategy.  Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending 
Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 
316 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft). 
 146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). 
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Courts interpret “this clause to have a procedural and a 
substantive component.”  Ellis, supra note 49, at 683–84 (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & 
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.1, at 544–45 (6th ed. 2000)). 
 148. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) 
(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 149. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 150. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.  Generally: 
[a] court must examine three critical issues in any procedural due process 
claim asserted by a foreign person or entity: (1) whether the person or entity 
has a constitutional presence in the United States; (2) whether government 
action deprived the person or entity of a constitutionally protected interest; and 
(3) whether the procedural protections provided by the government, if any, 
were constitutionally sufficient. 
Ellis, supra note 49, at 684 (footnote omitted). 
 151. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 690. 
 152. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  The plaintiffs, the LTTE and the People’s 
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) (also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the 
MEK, and the MKO), were designated as foreign terrorist organizations by then- 
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organizations without property or presence in the United States are not 
entitled to any due process protections.153  Two years later, the issue 
 
Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright on October 8, 1997.  See Designation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997).  Both 
organizations sought judicial review of the designations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1).  
People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 18–19.  In support of designating the LTTE a foreign 
terrorist organization, the court in People’s Mojahedin quoted unclassified material in 
the Secretary’s administrative record as follows: 
   “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was founded in 1976 for the purpose 
of creating a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka.  The group began its war 
against the Government of Sri Lanka in 1983 and has employed violent means, 
including bombings and political assassination, to achieve the goal of a 
separate entity in the North and East of the country.  Some 50,000 people are 
estimated to have died in fourteen years of fighting.”  “Sri Lankan military and 
intelligence sources that have reported reliably in the past have identified the 
Ellalan Force as another alias for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 
which “will hereafter be referred to as the ‘LTTE.’”  “Headquartered in the 
Jaffna Peninsula [of Sri Lanka], . . . Velupillai Prabhakaran,” “the founder and 
leader of Sri Lanka’s LTTE . . . organized the insurgency group to pursue an 
independent homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern regions 
out of frustration over the ethnic discrimination of the Sri Lankan government, 
according to press reports.”  “Tamils . . . are the mainstay of his organization, 
according to U.S. military officials.” 
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted) (alterations in original).  Furthermore, a February 1995 Hong 
Kong news story stated that the LTTE tacitly had admitted to having killed former Indian 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and that the group has been accused of killing Sri Lankan 
President Ranasinghe Premadasa.  Id. at 19–20.  A State Department report in 1996 reported: 
“The LTTE has refrained from targeting Western tourists, but a front group—the Ellalan 
Force—continued to send threatening letters to Western missions and the press.”  Id. at 
20.  Finally, designation is significant because the LTTE “exploits large Tamil communities 
in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its fighters in Sri 
Lanka.”  Id. 
In further support of designating the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization, a July  
1993 CIA intelligence research paper reported that the PMOI’s primary goal is to 
overthrow the Iranian government and that the organization’s history is “marked by 
violence and terrorism” and is “studded with anti-Western activity.”  Id.  For example, 
the PMOI assassinated at least six American citizens, supported the takeover of the U.S. 
embassy, and opposed the release of American hostages during its part to overthrow the 
former Shah of Iran.  Id.  The PMOI has had a history of bombing U.S.-associated 
targets, including the Iran-American Society and the offices of Pepsi Cola, General 
Motors, Pan-American Airlines, and Shell Oil Company.  Id.  Designation is also crucial 
because the PMOI, whose main ally and supporter at the time was Baghdad, has offices 
and members throughout North America, from which the PMOI collects donations to 
fund the PMOI’s activities and to show the organization support.  Id. at 20–21. 
 153. The plaintiffs challenged their respective designations, arguing that the 
Secretary’s factfinding procedures deprived them of due process, particularly because 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars the government from condemning 
organizations without giving them notice and the opportunity to be heard.  Id. at 22 
(referring to Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), 
which held that designating certain organizations as Communist violated due process).  
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took center stage in National Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Department of State (National Council).154  Applying the three factor 
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge,155 the D.C. Circuit found that a 
foreign organization with property in the United States is entitled, at a 
minimum, to notice and to some type of hearing prior to designation by 
the Secretary.156  The court viewed the procedural due process protections 
 
The court rejected this claim because the entities at issue in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee 
had been domestic, whereas the LTTE and the PMOI were foreign entities with no 
presence in the United States.  Id.  They were therefore not entitled to any constitutional 
due process rights.  Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 
(1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within 
the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this 
country.”) (alterations in original)).  The court concluded that the plaintiffs enjoy only 
statutory rights under the AEDPA, which allowed both organizations to contest their 
designations on grounds set forth in § 1189(b)(3).  Id.  The court did not answer the 
question of whether organizations with substantial connections in the United States are 
afforded any due process rights under the AEDPA. 
 154. 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The petitioners, the PMOI and its alias, the 
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), were redesignated and freshly designated 
respectively as foreign terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State on October 8, 
1999.  See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112, 55,112 
(Oct. 8, 1999).  The redesignation of the PMOI extended its 1997 designation for an 
additional two years after the Secretary found that the organization had continued to engage in 
terrorist activities, including the murder of two Iranian officials and “three separate 
bombings of Iranian government facilities in Iran.”  Ellis, supra note 49, at 692 n.116.  
The Secretary designated the NCRI for the first time as an “alter ego or alias” of the 
PMOI.  Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 197.  Both petitioners argued that designating them as 
foreign terrorist organizations without notice or hearing interfered with their rights to 
obtain and possess property in the United States and the rights of their members to enter 
the United States.  Id. at 200.  The Secretary thus “deprived them of ‘liberty, or property, 
without due process of law,’ in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”  Id.  The government’s defense was twofold, asserting that (1) the 
petitioners had no protected constitutional rights because they had not established 
physical presence in the United States, and (2) even if they did have such rights, none 
had been violated.  Id. 
 155. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  Generally, before the government constitutionally 
deprives a person of the protected liberty or property interest, the government must 
afford the affected person notice and a hearing.  Id. at 334.  The professed “Mathews 
balancing test” contains three distinct factors: (1) “the private interest that will be 
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.”  Id. at 335.  The test is applied to determine if an 
individual is entitled to a hearing prior to a governmental deprivation of a protected 
interest (the “when” of due process).  See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 205–06, 208.  The 
test is also applied to identify the precise procedures to be employed at the hearing (the 
“what” of due process).  See id.  The purpose of the constitutional right to be heard “is 
not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual,” but more particularly, “to 
minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations.”  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 
67, 80–81 (1972). 
 156. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208.  Unlike the decision in People’s Mojahedin 
Organization of Iran, the court in National Council determined that the PMOI had 
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provided by the government under the AEDPA as constitutionally 
insufficient.157 
Although the court in National Council deemed the AEDPA’s 
designation procedure invalid on due process grounds, the court neither  
vacated the designations at issue nor explicitly declared the AEDPA 
facially unconstitutional.158  One year later, a federal district court in United 
States v. Rahmani159 called the National Council court’s attempt to save 
the statute from facial invalidity “impermissible judicial legislation.”160  
In Rahmani, the defendants moved to dismiss an indictment charging 
them with violating § 2339B.161  The indictment described solicitations, 
wire transfers, and monetary donations by the defendants for the benefit 
of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) from October 8, 1997 
 
entered and established substantial connections with the United States.  Id. at 203.  Its 
alias, the NCRI, also developed substantial connections with the United States because 
of its “overt presence within the National Press Building in Washington, D.C.” and an 
interest in a two hundred dollar bank account.  Id. at 201, 203; see also Ellis, supra note 
49, at 693 n.122 (arguing that the only difference between a finding that PMOI lacked 
any constitutional presence in People’s Mojahedin and a finding of constitutional 
presence in National Council was the two hundred dollar bank account possessed by its 
alias, the NCRI).  Because presence was established, both organizations were entitled to 
constitutional protections.  Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 203. 
 157. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208–09. 
 158. Id. at 209.  Due to foreign policy and national security concerns, the court  
rather instructed that putative terrorist organizations receive the option of presenting and 
filing evidence in support of their allegations that they were not terrorist organizations.  
Id.  In addition, the court required that these organizations be afforded a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard by the Secretary upon the Secretary’s relevant findings.  Id. 
 159. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 160. Id. at 1056–57 (citing Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 500–01 (9th Cir. 2001), 
for the proposition that “where a statute permits only one permissible interpretation, it is 
not the province of the federal courts to rewrite the statute to accommodate a different 
interpretation” and Badaracco v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398 
(1984), for the proposition that “courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because 
they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement”)).  The Rahmani court did not 
believe that the court’s attempt in National Council to constitutionally construct § 1189 
would “save the statute from a claim of facial invalidity.”  Id. at 1057.  In addition, the 
court in Rahmani noted that the government, by citing to precedent where the Supreme 
Court upheld governmental actions even under an unconstitutional scheme, seemed to be 
arguing that the result in National Council is legally supportable (especially because “the 
D.C. Circuit found the MEK’s designation unconstitutional but, nevertheless, upheld 
such designation”).  Id. at 1058.  The court noted that the cases cited by the government 
were all civil cases, whereas the case at issue involved a criminal defendant charged with 
crimes amounting to at least fifteen years imprisonment.  Id.  The court stood firmly in 
its stance, choosing not to “abdicate its duty to ensure that the prosecution of such 
charges comports with due process.”  Id. 
 161. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
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through February 27, 2001.162  The defendants’ motion subsequently required 
the Rahmani court to resolve what it tabbed a “somewhat provocative 
question”: 
If the procedure whereby an organization is designated by the Secretary of State 
as “terrorist” violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, 
may such designation nevertheless be utilized as a predicate in a criminal 
prosecution against individuals for providing material support to that designated 
terrorist organization?163 
The answer echoed a resounding “no.”  The court established that       
§ 1189 does not provide a foreign organization with notice of impending 
designation, the occasion to supplement the record with information to 
contradict the designation, or an opportunity to object to the administrative 
record, which the Secretary creates and the judiciary solely considers on 
appeal.164  Consequently, the court concluded that any designation under 
the AEDPA is “a nullity” and thus could not be relied upon in a § 2339B 
prosecution.165 
The court in Rahmani drove a lethal stake into the AEDPA. To the 
glee of political activists, the legislation, which not so long ago stood tall 
as an effective weapon in stunting the growth of unwelcome and 
 
 162. The defendants were charged with conspiracy and fifty-eight substantive 
counts of providing material support to the MEK, an entity designated as a foreign 
terrorist organization under the AEDPA on October 8, 1997.  Id.; Designation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997).  The MEK is 
also known as the MKO and as the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).  
Id.  The indictment charged defendants Roya Rahmani, Mustafa Ahmady, Hossein 
Afshari, Alireza Mohammadmoradi, Mohammad Omidvar, Navid Taj, and Hassan 
Rezaie.  Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.  The defendants were arrested at Los 
Angeles International Airport (LAX) in February 2001 on charges of raising more than 
one million dollars for the MEK.  Two Iran-Related Terrorism Trials in U.S., 5 IRAN 
REPORT (July 1, 2002), http://www.rferl.org/iran-report/2002/07/24-010702.html.  The  
defendants allegedly solicited funds from passengers at LAX for a “charity called the 
Committee for Human Rights in Iran while displaying photos of alleged Iranian 
atrocities.”  Id.  The money received was then “transferred to bank accounts in Turkey” 
and allegedly used to buy weapons.  Id. 
 163. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. 
 164. Id. at 1055. 
 165. Id. at 1059.  The court derived this conclusion from two specific provisions of 
8 U.S.C. § 1189.  The first, § 1189(a)(3)(A), provides: “In making a designation under 
this subsection, the Secretary shall create an administrative record.”  The second, § 
1189(b)(2), provides: “Review under this subsection shall be based solely upon the 
administrative record, except that the Government may submit, for ex parte and in 
camera review, classified information used in making the designation.”  Id. at 1055.  The 
court, in “[c]onsidering these two subsections together,” concluded: “Section 1189 
provides for judicial review based solely on an administrative record created by the 
Secretary, without notice to or participation by the organization to be designated.”  Id.  In 
addition, the court noted that “apart from the administrative record, the only other matter 
that may be considered for judicial review is classified information provided by the 
government in support of the designation.”  Id.  Rather than constructing appropriate 
procedures into the AEDPA, the court invalidated the Act altogether.  See id. at 1058–59. 
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historically violent organizations, was immediately reduced to facially 
unconstitutional fodder.  Yet, we must ask at what cost?  Unquestionably, 
U.S. national security, the very basis for the AEDPA,166 suffered a 
severe setback.  And while the court in Humanitarian Law Project  
sidestepped well established precedent, such as NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co.167 and Buckley v. Valeo,168 for the sake of national security, 
the court in Rahmani failed to see the value of doing the same.169 
Since 9/11, the value of homeland security deserves to overshadow the 
rights of foreign organizations and their sponsors.  Even Americans 
themselves have consented to surrendering some of their freedoms for 
stronger U.S. safety laws.170  By utilizing three arguments outlined below, 
courts may provide the necessary framework required to revalidate the 
AEDPA: (1) Referring to compelling national security concerns to 
justify abridging procedural due process to terrorist organizations; (2)  
 
 166. In order for an entity to be designated as a foreign terrorist organization, the 
Secretary must find that the organization’s terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S. 
nationals or the national security of the United States.  8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (Supp. I 
2001).  Furthermore, a designation may be revoked depending on whether changed 
circumstances or the national security of the United States warrants such action.  See 
supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  Prior to Humanitarian Law Project, 
opponents predicted that the AEDPA fundraising ban would not survive the Buckley 
scrutiny standard, even though Buckley upheld limitations on campaign contributions.  
See Beall, supra note 45, at 700. 
 169. While the court in Rahmani ignored the government’s national security 
argument when determining the constitutionality of § 1189, it relied on the government’s 
judgment when refusing to settle the debate between certain members of Congress and 
the Secretary regarding whether the designation of the MEK was legitimately and 
factually supported.  See Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.  As to the uncertainty of the 
designation, the court stated that “Congress, and not the courts, has the fact-finding 
resources to conclude how best to prevent the United States from being used as a base 
for terrorist funding.”  Id. at 1052 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 
1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000)).  Moreover, “[w]hether the MEK is a foreign terrorist 
organization presents a political question.  ‘Political questions’ are controversies which 
revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionality committed to 
the Congress or the Executive Branch, and are not subject to judicial review.”  Id. at 
1051.  The court admitted that if it weighed in on the debate, it would create “the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question.”  Id. at 1052.  However, this concern did not stop the court from 
determining the constitutionality of § 1189, even when it had no statutory authorization 
to do so.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 170. Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1084 & n.8 (“[S]eventy-eight percent of 
those polled stated they would accept new security laws, even if it meant fewer privacy 
protections . . . .”) (citing NBC News/Wall Street Journal: 72% Say U.S. Is Moving in the 
Right Direction, THE HOTLINE, Sept. 17, 2001, WL 9/17/2001 APN-HO 37). 
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fulfilling four independent factors to defend security measures as 
appropriate crisis legislation despite curtailing civil liberties; and (3) 
recognizing that the decision that invalidated the AEDPA should be 
revoked due to improper judicial review. 
A.  National Security: Abridging Procedural Due Process to             
Terrorist Organizations 
One effective policy-driven argument proffered by the government, 
although irrelevant to the claim that § 1189 is facially unconstitutional, 
is that invalidating the AEDPA would result in serious negative 
consequences on U.S. counterterrorism efforts.171  National security is a 
matter of “concern and responsibility,” the court responded, but such an 
argument “should not serve as an excuse for obliterating the Constitution” 
when “weighed against a fundamental constitutional right which defines 
our very existence.”172  The court suggested that the Secretary should make 
every effort “to weigh the circumstances where national security concerns 
can rationally coexist within a constitutional atmosphere” and remarked 
that the Secretary made no such attempt in the case at issue.173  The court 
thus noted that “time honored constitutional protections” should not be 
dispensed with by way of the Secretary’s failing to show how a 
designated entity is a national security threat.174 
The significance of national security should not be so easily dismissed.  
Among all else, “‘no governmental interest is more compelling than the 
security of the nation.’”175 Furthermore, the preservation of this country’s 
safety constitutes an “extraordinary situation” that justifies postponing 
both notice and the opportunity to be heard.176  For example, the Supreme 
 
 171. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 (citing to the fourth footnote of the 
government’s supplemental brief). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. at 1057–58 (noting that “[t]he moral strength, vitality and commitment 
proudly enunciated in the Constitution is best tested at a time when forceful, emotionally 
moving arguments to ignore or trivialize its provisions seek a subordination of time 
honored constitutional protections”). 
 175. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 207 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (concluding that the United 
States had a compelling governmental interest to protect foreign policy and revoke a 
former CIA employee’s passport for denouncing the CIA and exposing confidential 
information to foreign countries)). 
 176. Ellis, supra note 49, at 675–76 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 
(1972)).  In Fuentes, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of Florida and 
Pennsylvania laws authorizing the summary seizure of goods or chattels in a person’s 
possession under a writ of replevin, neither of which provided notice or hearing to the 
possessor of property prior to seizure.  Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 69–70.  The Court concluded 
that these statutes serve no important governmental or general public interest compared 
to those statutes substantiated in state actions furthering war efforts or protecting the 
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Court has allowed the outright seizure of property, without notice to the 
possessor, only when “truly unusual” circumstances warrant the seizure, 
and even then several safeguards must be met: (1) The seizure must be  
“directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general 
public interest”; (2) there must be a “special need for very prompt action”; 
and (3) “the person initiating the seizure [must be] a government official 
responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn 
statute, that [action is] necessary and justified in the particular 
instance.”177  The Court has curtailed procedural due process to meet the 
needs of a war effort,178 to protect against certain economic disasters,179 
and to protect the public from misbranded drugs180 and contaminated 
food.181  Protecting against terrorism by designating predefined foreign 
groups with financial assets in the United States as terrorist organizations 
similarly represents an unusual circumstance worthy of postponing due 
process.  Under the elements set forth in Fuentes, the AEDPA results in: 
(1) the securing of an important governmental interest by incriminating 
donors and “seizing” resources contributed to foreign organizations in 
order to deter acts of terrorism (a general public interest), (2) the ability 
to act promptly especially because such action may be the difference 
between preserving life and mass casualties, and (3) a determination 
made by a government official (the Secretary) in accordance with the 
terms of a narrowly tailored statute (the AEDPA).182 
Thus, without mentioning the procedural elements underlying the Due 
Process Clause,183 national security interests alone justify the abridgement 
 
public health.  Id. at 92–93. 
 177. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90–91. 
 178. See Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245 (1921) (holding that enemy property 
may be seized during wartime without notice so long as an adequate provision for return 
in the case of a mistake was provided); Cent. Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 
566 (1921) (stating that Congress has the power to seize property of the enemy during 
times of war without notice). 
 179. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947) (stating that the “delicate 
nature” of certain economic situations have created an “almost invariable custom” to 
allow the exercise of authority in a “summary manner” and without a hearing). 
 180. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950). 
 181. See N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908). 
 182. See Ellis, supra note 49, at 707–09 (applying the elements to the specific facts 
of National Council). 
 183. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also supra note 147.  
Courts, in “[a]pplying this so-called Mathews balancing test,” hold that due process 
requires “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’”  Ellis, supra note 49, at 
689 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).  However, in 
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of “time honored constitutional protections.”184  Moreover, requiring the 
Secretary to show at the outset that a security threat exists within a 
designated group will hinder, not help, the long and difficult fight 
against terror.185  If an organization receives notice, especially in a 
predesignation hearing as advocated by the court in National Council,186 
the organization may immediately circumvent the harsh consequences of 
designation by, for example, “transfer[ring] all of its financial assets 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States.”187  This undoubtedly frustrates 
both the “intent of Congress and the foreign policy goals of the 
President”188 and leaves the AEDPA with no deterrent effect, no 
consequence, and no meaning. 
The court in National Council simply refused to understand this 
concern, despite recognizing three concepts that seem to support the 
contrary.  First, the “changeable and explosive nature of contemporary 
international relations” should be sufficient to warrant dispensing with 
an otherwise available predeprivation hearing.189  Second, certain classified 
information not considered dangerous, or even important, by judges may 
nonetheless “make all too much sense to a foreign counterintelligence 
specialist who could learn much about this nation’s intelligence-
gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources 
 
“extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake,” 
postponement of a hearing until after the deprivation of the interest at issue is justified.  
Ellis, supra note 49, at 689 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).  
Therefore, even when applying the Mathews factors of procedural due process, fighting 
terrorism may be argued to invoke the “extraordinary situation” exception that justifies 
postponing due process.  See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 
F.3d 192, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 184. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 185. Since 9/11, the United States has consistently warned that the war against 
terrorism will be long, difficult, and dangerous.  See Nick Cook, “A Long, Difficult and 
Dangerous Campaign,” JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY (Oct. 2, 2001), http://www.janes.com/ 
defence/airforces/news/jdw/jdw011002_1_n.shtml (citing to comments made by U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).  The Bush Administration has consistently 
warned Americans to brace for a long and bloody campaign.  See Afghanistan: One Year 
Later, CNN.COM (Oct. 10, 2002), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/ 
timep.afghanistan.year.later.tm/index.html. 
 186. See Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207–08. 
 187. Ellis, supra note 49, at 676. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 207 (quoting Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 853 
F.2d 932, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  In Shultz, the State Department ordered the closing of 
the Palestine Information Office (PIO) in Washington, D.C. after it found that the PIO 
operated as a foreign mission for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).  Shultz, 
853 F.2d at 934.  The national interest of curbing international terrorism mandated this 
action pursuant to the Foreign Missions Amendments Act of 1983.  See id.; see also 
Foreign Missions Amendments Act of 1983, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000).  The PIO’s due 
process claim failed on appeal because foreign policy concerns and explosive 
international relations defer to the need of the executive branch to act swiftly and 
authoritatively.  Shultz, 853 F.2d at 942–43. 
AGARWAL.DOC 9/17/2019  11:04 AM 
[VOL. 41:  839, 2004]  Obstructing Justice 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 881 
and methods.”190  In other words, requiring the Secretary to convey this 
information to the very organizations being denounced, simply in order 
to preserve due process, would enervate U.S. intelligence.  Third, alerting 
organizations of impending designation “might work harm to this 
country’s foreign policy goals in ways that the court would not 
immediately perceive.”191 
In recognizing these principles, the court opened the door for an 
exception, consistent with the full history of due process jurisprudence, 
in cases where earlier notification of designation would impinge upon 
U.S. national security and other foreign policy goals.192  In these cases, 
the Secretary may demonstrate the need to withhold all notice and all 
opportunity to present evidence until a designation formally takes 
place.193  However, this exception is not an adequate solution because 
the court in National Council admitted that, in most circumstances, as 
soon as the Secretary reaches a tentative determination of the impending 
designation, the Secretary must provide notice of unclassified material, 
including the action sought.194  This in turn provides enough forewarning 
so that a designated entity may evade as much statutory punishment as 
possible.195 
Decided before the 9/11 attacks,196 National Council’s valiant yet 
shortsighted effort to carve out an exception fails to address the 
compelling national security concerns that encompass the current state 
of international affairs.197  The same cannot be said for Rahmani, a 
 
 190. Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 208 (quoting United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 
623 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 191. Id.  The court provides an example of one such notice that the Secretary may 
give to putative terrorist organizations: “We are considering designating you as a foreign 
terrorist organization, and in addition to classified information, we will be using the 
following summarized administrative record.  You have the right to come forward with 
any other evidence you may have that you are not a foreign terrorist organization.”  Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 209.  The Secretary may withhold classified information to be 
presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the AEDPA, but still must disclose 
the action sought.  Id. at 208. 
 195. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 196. National Council was argued on November 15, 2000 and decided on June 8, 
2001.  251 F.3d at 192. 
 197. Two days after the 9/11 attacks, House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt 
(D-Mo.) stated: “We’re in a new world where we have to rebalance freedom and 
security.”  Eric Pianin & Thomas B. Edsall, Terrorism Bills Revive Civil Liberties 
Debate, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at A16.  The events of 9/11 have also led to the 
advent of the “Homeland Security Advisory System,” a color-coded U.S. threat advisory 
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decision that devoted relatively little thought to the government’s 
security concerns, despite being decided nine months after the events of 
9/11.198  The Rahmani court cited Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,199 a 
1963 case involving the constitutionality of divesting draft evaders of 
their citizenship,200 and quoted Ex parte Milligan, a similar case decided 
in 1866,201 as its only support for choosing to safeguard due process even 
in the gravest of emergencies.202  With respect to a changed world, these 
sources are painfully inadequate. 
B.  Crisis Legislation: The Age-Old Conflict Between                                
Civil Liberties and National Security 
The conflict between civil liberties and national security is as old as 
the United States itself.203  It is certainly not novel to offer safety as a 
 
system unveiled by Homeland Security Chief Tom Ridge that creates “‘a national 
framework and a common vocabulary’ so that government and the private sector can 
deal effectively and efficiently with threats of terrorist attack.”  Terror Threat Warning 
System Unveiled, CNN.COM (Mar. 12, 2002) (quoting Homeland Security Chief Tom 
Ridge), at http://www.CNN.com/2002/US/03/12/rec.threat.alerts/index.html.  The warning 
system is comprised of five levels starting with green, the lowest alert level, then blue, 
yellow, orange, and red, the highest alert level.  Id.  Each code and color triggers certain 
actions by federal agencies and state and local governments.  Id.; see also Ridge Tries to 
Calm America’s Nerves, CNN.COM (Feb. 14, 2003), at http://www.CNN.com/2003/ 
ALLPOLITICS/02/14/homeland.security/index.html (describing the heightened fear of 
Americans as a result of the system’s elevated terror alert, causing people to seal their 
homes with plastic sheeting and duct tape in the case of a chemical attack). 
 198. United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(decided June 21, 2002). 
 199. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 200. Id. at 164–65 (1963) (determining that draft evaders should be punished but 
not without due process of the law). 
 201. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 20–21 (1866) (holding that the 
Constitution applies equally in times of war as well as times of peace).  For further 
discussion of Ex parte Milligan, a dispute involving the conviction by a military 
commission of a civilian who had not joined the Confederacy, see Oren Gross, Chaos 
and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1011, 1053 (2003). 
 202. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1057 n.15. 
 203. PBS, Civil Liberties and National Security Timeline, at http://www.pbs.org/ 
now/politics/timeline.html (Feb. 7, 2003).  In 53 A.D., Roman philosopher Marcus 
Tullius Cicero stated: “[I]nter arma enim silent leges (amidst the clash of arms, laws fall 
silent).”  Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?, 19 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 427 n.66 (2000) (discussing crimes of aggression 
in an international context).  Similarly, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist has recognized that times of questionable international safety impact 
Americans’ domestic freedoms.  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 224 (1998).  Chief Justice Rehnquist commented:  “It is neither 
desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a position in 
wartime as it does in peacetime.”  Id. at 224–25.  Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-
Miss.) has echoed this sentiment, admitting that “when you’re at war, civil liberties are 
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reason to diminish certain constitutional rights when the situation 
warrants.  For example, threatened by Confederate forces during the 
Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus, reduced freedom of the press, and tried civilians in military 
tribunals.204  Furthermore, during World War I, Congress outlawed 
mailings advocating treason, insurrection, and forcible resistance to U.S. 
law in order to suppress fear of subversion by propagandists.205  A 
 
treated differently.”  Pianin & Edsall, supra note 197.  In contrast, Rep. John Conyers 
(D-Mich.), proclaimed: “Safety should not come at the sacrifice of civil liberties.”  Toni 
Locy, Justice Dept. Prohibits Racial Profiling: But Agents Can Use It to Identify 
Terrorists, USA TODAY, June 18, 2003, at 3A (reacting to the Bush Administration’s 
policy of banning federal law enforcement officers from racial profiling in routine police 
work yet permitting the use of race and ethnicity in identifying suspected terrorists). 
 204. Special Event, The Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 351, 351 (1998).  Lincoln is often considered a “champion of justice and moral 
righteousness,” but his suppression of civil liberties during the Civil War “casts him in a 
somewhat unfavorable light.”  Captain Robert G. Bracknell, All the Laws But One: Civil 
Liberties in Wartime, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 208, 209–10 (2000) (book review) (explaining 
that the writ of habeas corpus, or “The Great Writ,” requires the executive to legitimately 
justify the detainment of a prisoner to a court of law and that the writ is considered a 
“sacred right of the people against sovereign authority”).  Writing for the Supreme Court 
in the case of John Merryman, a southern sympathizer arrested for “destroying railroad 
bridges after an antiwar riot in Baltimore,” Chief Justice Roger B. Taney ruled that 
President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was unconstitutional because (1) only 
Congress could suspend habeas corpus, and (2) the President as a result exceeded his war 
powers.  Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military 
Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1229–30 (2002) (citing 
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861)).  Although Justice Taney rejected the 
proposition that at times of war the President has the authority to do whatever is 
necessary to protect the country, he did acknowledge that an act of Congress could 
authorize the suspension.  Id. at 1230.  On March 3, 1863, after President Lincoln 
requested that Congress sanction his actions, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act, 
authorizing the President “to suspend habeas corpus whenever he determined public 
safety required suspension.”  Id. at 1231–32.  For more on President Lincoln’s role as a 
civil libertarian, see generally Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great 
Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353 (1993) (reviewing MARK E. 
NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)). 
 205. See Murray L. Schwartz & James C.N. Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda 
in the Mails: A Report on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 
621, 624 (1959).  After the United States entered World War I in April of 1917, anti-
German sentiment rose to great heights.  Consequently, Americans considered support of 
German culture and any criticism of the war as treason.  Congress passed a series of 
laws, including the Espionage Act of 1917, which “made it a crime to interfere with the 
military or recruiting services or to mail materials ‘advocating treason, insurrection, or 
forcible resistance to any law of the United States.’”  Joseph A. Ranney, Aliens and 
“Real Americans”: Law and Ethnic Assimilation in Wisconsin, 1846–1920, WIS. LAW., 
Dec. 1994, at 30–31.  The act was expanded in 1918 “to prohibit criticism of the flag, the 
armed forces, the Constitution and the American form of government.”  Id. at 31.  In 
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countless number of cases exist where, in times of stress and conflict, 
many civil liberties have been compromised in the name of national 
security; yet not all of these cases are legitimately supported.206  In an 
effort to justify the AEDPA as appropriate crisis legislation, thus 
distinguishing it from previous blatant attacks on civil liberties, this 
Comment sets forth a four-prong security legislation test.  If each prong 
of this test is met, U.S. security legislation should pass constitutional 
justification even if individual rights are sacrificed in the process. 
The first prong of the test requires the presence of an “undeclared” 
war or commencement of armed aggression,207 leading to extraneous 
foreign and international hostilities implicating a substantial U.S. 
interest.  International terrorism, such as the 1993 World Trade Center 
and 1995 Oklahoma City bombings,208 is a prime illustration, as is the 
 
addition, the Selective Draft Act of 1917 criminalized the act of “discourag[ing] men 
from registering for the draft or serving in the armed forces.”  Id. at 59 n.18.  The 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 required “publishers of foreign language articles 
about the war” to “file English translations . . . with local postmasters before 
publication.”  Id.  Due to the heavy expense, many foreign language newspapers were 
forced to shut down.  Id.  The Tariff Act of 1930 authorized customs officials to seize 
any material advocating treason or insurrection, thereby denying the importation of such 
material into the country.  See Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 688 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1305 (2000)). 
 206. For an introductory discussion on the relationship between security and liberty 
in the United States, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955–58 
(2002) (arguing that, when balancing liberty and security, it is important to preserve 
equal dignity and basic human rights of all persons and not to succumb to the temptation 
of purchasing security at the expense of noncitizens’ basic rights).  Cole gives three 
reasons to be cautious about too readily sacrificing liberty in the name of security, 
especially in the wake of 9/11.  First, as a historical matter, the United States has often 
overreacted in times of crisis.  Id. at 955.  Second, in times of crisis, there is a chance 
that the United States will overestimate its security needs.  This sentiment may lead to 
feelings of physical stress and anxiety, which are much more “immediate and palpable” 
than the abstract concept of “liberty,” which can easily be taken for granted.  Id. at 955–
56.  Third, liberty and security are not “mutually exclusive values in a zero-sum game.”  
Id. at 956.  In other words, decreasing liberty does not necessarily increase security.  Id.  
Often, decreasing liberty inspires more violence.  Id.  While these reasons are worthy of 
mention, they are given to criticize the unequal treatment of non-U.S. citizens in relation 
to U.S. citizens, and not to criticize the antifundraising provisions of the AEDPA.  See 
id. at 957. 
 207. See Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1543, 1543–48 (2002).  This definition is intended to be broad, as was the definition of 
“declaring war” in the eighteenth century, and is meant to include armed attacks with the 
intent to settle differences between nations by force even if no formal proclamations of 
war are present.  See id.  Undeclared wars and low level hostilities were a great part of 
eighteenth century reality, and formal declarations were not necessary or even common 
prior to initiating these hostilities.  Id. at 1558.  In addition, although most scholars agree 
that the term “‘armed attack’ entails a serious attack, which is not one-time, against the 
territory of a State or its citizens,” the definition as used here does incorporate serious 
one-time attacks.  See Gross, supra note 44, at 93. 
 208. See supra notes 41–42.  The February 26, 1993 bombing of New York City’s 
World Trade Center, which along with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing provoked the 
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post 9/11 undeclared “War on Terrorism.”209 
The second prong of the test requires that only those who possess 
certain qualities, or belong to a certain class as set forth by specific 
statutory rules, will have their constitutional rights compromised.  In 
other words, before any group has its rights abridged, it must satisfy a 
set of meticulously predefined provisions and qualifications set forth in a 
duly elected statute.  For example, the AEDPA provides detailed guidelines 
for designating a group as a foreign terrorist organization.210 
The third prong of the test requires that the penalties of designation as 
a specific group under the statute must have reasonable temporal limits.  
For instance, the penalties of designation under the AEDPA last two 
years.211 
The fourth and final prong of the test requires that an appropriate and 
specified appellate process exist by which the affected class of persons 
 
passage of the AEDPA, was remembered at the time as “the gravest attack of 
international terrorism to occur directly on American soil.”  Anti-Defamation League,  
The World Trade Center Bombing, at http://www.adl.org/learn/jttf/wtcb_jttf.asp (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2003).  Moreover, international hostilities between the United States and 
Iraq can be linked to both bombings.  A persuasive case has been made that World Trade 
Center bombing mastermind Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi intelligence agent.  Jack Kelly, 
Jewish World Review, Saddam’s American Friends (Apr. 8, 2002), at http://www.jewish 
worldreview.com/0402/jkelly040802.asp.  When Timothy McVeigh, executed for his 
role in the Oklahoma City bombing, was arrested, he had several Iraqi telephone 
numbers on his person.  Id.  Witnesses claimed to have seen McVeigh with a “Middle 
Eastern-looking person.”  Id.  Furthermore: 
   An Iraqi connection could explain [multiple facets of the Oklahoma City 
bombing, including] the frequent trips to the Philippines of McVeigh 
confederate Terry Nichols, where his path apparently crossed with that of 
Ramzi Yousef; how McVeigh and Nichols, who had no visible means of 
support, acquired the money to carry out the bombing; and how they acquired 
the expertise to build their bomb, which was very like the explosive used at the 
World Trade Center the year before. 
Id. 
 209. See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 22, at 1085.  Moreover: 
The terrorist enemy that threatens civilization today is unlike any we have ever 
known.  It slaughters thousands of innocents—a crime of war and a crime 
against humanity.  It seeks weapons of mass destruction and threatens their use 
against America.  No one should doubt the intent, nor the depth, of its 
consuming, destructive hatred. 
Hearings, supra note 145, at 315.  Similarly, the Patriot Act defines domestic terrorism 
as acts dangerous to human life that occur primarily in U.S. jurisdiction and are intended 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or intended to influence the government, by 
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.  See Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 
§ 802, 115 Stat. 376. 
 210. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. I 2001). 
 211. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(A) (2000). 
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may, in a U.S. tribunal, contest the alleged deprivation of their 
constitutional rights.  The AEDPA sets forth a timeframe for judicial 
review as well as multiple grounds for reversal.212 
Critics may argue that this test is far too stringent and that only the 
most complete and detailed measures will satisfy it.  Others will claim 
that national security legislation is often enacted immediately following 
a catastrophic event, making these factors almost impossible to satisfy 
on such short notice.  Both of these arguments are fair and deserve 
consideration.  It undeniably takes a comprehensive, carefully planned, 
and narrowly tailored government action to pass this test.213  Abruptly 
written and hastily enacted laws will most likely fail.  But more 
importantly, properly drafted laws can ultimately pass this test, and the 
most meritorious will survive the inevitable process of judicial review.  
Such legislation will allow the government to strengthen national 
security during the most ominous times of stress and crisis.  The 
AEDPA passes this test. 
In order to better assess the usefulness of the “security legislation test” 
and to distinguish the AEDPA from previous attacks on individual 
freedoms, the following subsections will apply the four factors set out 
above to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798214 and the propriety of 
Japanese internment camps during World War II. 
1.  Distinguishing the Alien and Sedition Acts 
Within a four-week period in the summer of 1798, President John 
Adams incurred tremendous condemnation due to a set of four laws, 
known as the Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted by the Federalist Party-
controlled Congress under his guard.215  Provoked by fear that the French 
 
 212. See supra Part III.A. 
 213. Passing this test may equal satisfying the strict scrutiny standard, the most 
rigorous and exacting standard of constitutional review.  See supra note 108.  In order to 
overcome this standard, a statute must be narrowly tailored to directly advance a 
compelling governmental interest.  Id.  However, unlike the security legislation test  
proposed herein, strict scrutiny also requires that the statute at issue be the least 
restrictive effective means of advancing a compelling governmental interest.  See id.  It 
is also important to note that under the test, race-based classifications may pass initially, 
but will likely fail once opponents challenge them in court or in another arena in which 
they are permitted to invoke judicial review. 
 214. The immigration provisions of the Alien and Sedition Acts have been 
compared with those in the Patriot Act.  See Jennifer Van Bergen, Repeal the USA 
Patriot Act Part II: The Wheel of History (Apr. 2, 2002), at http://www.truthout. 
org/docs02/04.03D.JVB.Patriot.htm. 
 215. See Gregory Fehlings, Storm on the Constitution: The First Deportation Law, 
10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 63, 64–65 (2002); see also Martin E. Halstuk, Policy of 
Secrecy—Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right 
to Know, 1794–98, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 51, 70–73 (2002).  Congress enacted four 
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Revolution would spread into the United States and by certain political 
tactics by the British Parliament,216 Congress intended to bolster national 
defense against both external threats and internal subversion.217  The laws 
also sought to gain an “upper hand” on Thomas Jefferson’s Democratic-
Republican Party,218 which sympathized with and “proudly supported 
the French Revolution as progeny of the American Revolution.”219 
Comprised of two parts, the Sedition Act220 created the most daunting 
restraint on civil liberties, prohibiting spoken or written criticism of 
Congress, the President, and the U.S. government in general.221  The first 
 
statutes in this “crisis-laden” atmosphere—the Alien Act, Alien Enemies Act, 
Naturalization Act, and Sedition Act.  These collectively became known as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts.  Fehlings, supra, at 65; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of 
‘98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 703–04 (1994) (noting that 
hostilities between the Americans and French “accelerated after negotiations between the 
countries broke down altogether in March 1798”). 
 216. Edmund Burke, an eighteenth century Irish political philosopher and liberal 
member of the British Parliament, warned in 1790 that the French Revolution “by its 
nature would spread violently to other countries.”  Fehlings, supra note 215, at 66.  The 
British Parliament responded, passing the Alien Act of 1793 and the Seditious Meetings 
and Assemblies Act of 1795 to “prevent spread of the French Revolution to Britain.”  Id.  
 217. Id. at 64–65.  Though “France had helped the United States win its 
independence during the Revolutionary War, the French Revolution had transformed the 
European nation.”  Id. at 64.  France sought a revolutionary republic, all while beheading 
King Louis XVI in 1793 and executing 17,000 people in eleven months.  Id.  After this 
period, named “‘The Terror,’ the French Directory, a ruling council of five directors, 
assumed power in 1795.”  Id.  After “Presidents George Washington and John Adams 
refused to allow the United States to be dragged into France’s wars against Great Britain 
and other European powers, the French Directory launched a retaliatory war of 
commercial plunder against America,” during which “[t]he French seized over 2,000 
American merchant ships.”  Id.  This and other developments, including news that 
“General Napoleon Bonaparte had assembled an invasion force,” prompted Congress to 
take measures for stronger internal security.  Id. at 64–65. 
 218. Nancy Murray & Sarah Wunsch, Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis: Lessons 
from History, 87 MASS. L. REV. 72, 73 (2002). 
 219. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 65.  Jefferson wrote that “he preferred to see ‘half 
the world desolated’ than see the French Revolution falter.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 220. The House of Representatives narrowly passed the Sedition Act by a 44 to 41 
vote.  Halstuk, supra note 215, at 70 (citing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 
596–97 (expired 1800)). 
 221. § 2, 1 Stat. at 596–97.  The Sedition Act provided the following: 
And be it further enacted, That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, 
or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall 
knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or 
publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United 
States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said 
government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to 
bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against 
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part of the Act forbade planned resistance to public measures.222  The 
second part proscribed criticism of the government that was “malicious, 
untrue, alienated the people’s affections from their government, or 
brought the government into the contempt of the people.”223  Within two 
years of Congress’s passing the law, “[twenty-five] persons were arrested, 
up to [eighteen] were indicted and [ten] were tried and convicted, most 
of them Republican printers and journalists who supported Jefferson.”224  
Although virtually all of today’s commentators agree that the Sedition 
Act violated fundamental principles of representative democracy, many 
scholars in the late eighteenth century defended seditious libel laws and 
called government dissenters undemocratic.225 
The other three laws, most relevant in the context of protecting against 
foreign attacks, were expressly directed at aliens due to fear of French 
 
them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United 
States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful 
combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or 
any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such 
law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or 
to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any 
hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or 
government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the 
United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not 
exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two 
years. 
Id. 
 222. James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The 
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 
117, 122 (1999). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Halstuk, supra note 215, at 71.  The Sedition Act lasted less than two years, 
just as the Democratic-Republican Party came to power.  Judith Schenck Koffler & 
Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 827 (1984).  
Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions in 1798, which denounced the Sedition Act 
and helped him earn the presidency in 1800, “whereupon he pardoned those convicted 
under the Act and remitted their fines.”  J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy 
Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1407 (1992). 
 225. See Martin, supra note 222, at 123–27.  The Federalists, for example, argued 
that by obstructing the government’s ability to make policy decisions, one “obstructs the 
majority” because the majority had elected the government to make those decisions.  Id. 
at 127.  Federalists also argued that one who insulted elected officials insulted the people 
who elected them.  Id.  Moreover, Federalists relied upon the common law as an adjunct 
to the Constitution, which provided that the United States “as a sovereign power 
possessed, ‘from the nature of things,’ the inherent ‘right to preserve and defend itself 
against injuries and outrages that endanger its existence.’”  Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of 
Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the 
Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919, 938 (1992) (quoting 8 
ANNALS OF CONG. 2146 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Otis)). 
Even Jefferson did not attack the Sedition Act on grounds that Congress wrongfully 
abridged freedoms of speech and the press, but that the laws were unconstitutional 
because the states, not the federal government, owned the natural rights to regulate the 
press.  Halstuk, supra note 215, at 73. 
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invasion and insurrection.226  First, the Naturalization Act increased the 
time of residence necessary to acquire U.S. citizenship, and thus the 
right to vote, from five to fourteen years.227  Citing national security 
reasons and improved monitoring of potentially subversive aliens, 
“Congress barred the naturalization of aliens of a country at war with the 
United States, and it commanded all white immigrants to register with 
the government.”228  Not coincidentally, immigrants were increasingly 
offering their political support to Republicans.229  Second, the Alien 
Act230 gave the President enormous discretion to imprison or deport 
aliens suspected of posing a threat to the national government without a 
formal hearing.231  The final component, the Alien Enemies Act,232 further 
 
 226. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 66–69.  In fact, “John Quincy Adams, President 
Adams’ son and U.S. Ambassador to Prussia, advised his father that France intended to 
invade America’s western frontier.”  Id. at 66.  Speculation of French troops destined for 
the United States induced President Adams to call George Washington from retirement 
in order to command the U.S. Army.  Id.  “French emigré Médéric Louis-Elie Moreau de 
Saint-Méry wrote . . . of the nation’s anxiety: ‘People acted as though a French invasion 
force might land in America at any moment.  Everybody was suspicious of everybody 
else: everywhere one saw murderous glances.’”  Id. at 67 (footnote omitted). 
 227. See id. at 69. 
 228. Id.; see Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566–69 (1798) (repealed by 
Naturalization Act, § 2, 2 Stat. 153 (1802)). 
 229. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, 
and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and 
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833, 834 (1997). 
 230. The Alien Act is also known as “An Act Concerning Aliens” (Alien Act).  An 
Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798).  Congress modeled the Alien Act on 
the British Aliens Act of 1793, “which authorized the expulsion of any alien considered 
dangerous.”  Fehlings, supra note 215, at 70.  The law was to expire in two years but was 
never enforced.  Id. at 71, 74.  The Supreme Court would later remark: “The act was 
passed during a period of great political excitement, and it was attacked and defended 
with great zeal and ability.”  Id. at 70 (quoting Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581, 610–11 (1889)). 
 231. Fehlings, supra note 215, at 70–74.  Specifically, the law, as a temporary war 
measure, authorized the President at his discretion to deport aliens “dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the United States” or those suspected of “any treasonable or secret 
machinations against the government.”  Id. at 73.  Fehlings also characterized the Alien 
Act as: 
requir[ing] captains of arriving ships to report all aliens on board.  An alien 
who reentered the United States after having been expelled committed a 
criminal offense, and upon conviction, the alien faced imprisonment for as 
long as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety required.  Federal 
courts had jurisdiction over “all crimes and offenses against this act,” but all 
other matters lay within the President’s authority. 
Id. at 72; see also Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570–71 (1798). 
 232. This Act is also known as “An Act Respecting Alien Enemies.”  Alien 
Enemies Act, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (1798). 
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provided for the arrest, confinement, and expulsion of aliens of an 
enemy nation.233 
The Alien and Sedition legislation may have been passed at a time of 
international hostility between the United States and France, but all four 
of the Acts fail under the security legislation test.234  The Alien Enemies 
Act, the lone statute that has survived intact to the present day,235 fulfills 
the first two prongs236 but fails to delineate the time period for which its 
provisions deprive aliens of their constitutional rights.237  The Alien 
Enemies Act also fails to provide an adequate appellate procedure by 
which aliens of an enemy nation may seek judicial review.238  As a 
result, the Alien and Sedition Acts are invalid examples of national 
 
 233. In particular, the Alien Enemies Act provided for the arrest, confinement, or 
expulsion of aliens of an enemy nation:  
whenever there shall be a declared war between the United States and any 
foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion shall be 
perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, . . . 
and the President of the United States shall make public proclamation of the 
event. 
Id.  Upon such a proclamation or such a declaration of war, alien enemies could be 
arrested, detained, and removed from the United States without a hearing.  Id. 
 234. See supra Part IV.B. 
 235. Sidak, supra note 224, at 1407.  “The [Alien Enemies] Act, with minor revisions, 
remains part of the United States Code to this day and has been used as recently as 
1950.”  Fehlings, supra note 215, at 74; see also Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa, 79 F. Supp. 
468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (“There can be no question that the Enemy Aliens Act is 
constitutional.”).  Its constitutionality was never seriously questioned by pro-Federalist 
intellects such as Jefferson and James Madison.  See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 
171 n.18 (1948) (observing that “there was never any issue raised as to the validity of the 
Alien Enemy Act”). 
 236. First, the Alien Enemies Act “reflected the tensions that existed between the 
United States and France . . . that eventually erupted into the undeclared Quasi War at 
sea.”  Sidak, supra note 224, at 1406 (footnote omitted); see also supra Part IV.B.  
Second, the Alien Enemy Act curtails civil liberties of a specified class of persons 
labeled “alien enemies,” including “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of a hostile 
nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be 
within the United States and not actually naturalized.”  Sidak, supra note 224, at 1408.  
As originally drafted, the statute was applied only to males and amended during World 
War I to apply equally to women.  Id. at 1408 n.30 (citing Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 
1, 1 Stat. 577; Act of Apr. 16, 1918, ch. 55, 40 Stat. 531). 
 237. Although the Alien Enemies Act sets forth circumstances that trigger its 
applicability, namely, when either (1) a foreign nation or government attacks, or is about 
to attack, the United States or (2) there is a formal declaration of war by the United 
States, the law fails to set a specific time period that defines the duration of its 
consequences.  See 50 U.S.C. § 21 (1988).  The Alien Enemies Act authorizes the President to 
control the manner and degree of the restraint that aliens are subjected to as well as other 
regulations deemed necessary for public safety.  Sidak, supra note 224, at 1408–09. 
 238. Sidak, supra note 224, at 1420–24.  The Alien Enemies Act’s “terms, purpose, 
and construction leave no doubt” as to its preclusion of judicial review.  Id. at 1421 
(quoting Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163–64).  Aliens seeking judicial review must petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus while sitting incarcerated and awaiting deportation, but many 
times the incarceration can last as long as the hostilities that invoked the incarceration, 
making judicial review pointless.  See id. at 1421. 
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security legislation. 
2.  Distinguishing Japanese Internment 
On December 8, 1941, one day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, 
Congress declared war against Japan.239  Two months later, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066,240 which gave 
broad authority to the military to secure U.S. borders and to remove any 
individual, whether an American citizen or not, in order to create 
military-only zones.241  Although Japanese Americans were not singled 
out, the order ultimately removed and imprisoned nearly the entire 
Japanese American population inhabiting America’s west coast.242  
 
 239. Declaration of War Against Japan, Pub. L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat. 795 (1941). 
 240. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1938–1943).  The order requires 
every possible protection against espionage and sabotage to national defense material, 
national defense premises, and national defense utilities.  Id.  The order specifically 
provides the following: 
[B]y virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the 
Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to 
time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action 
necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such 
extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from 
which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right 
of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever 
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may 
impose in his discretion.  The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide 
for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, 
food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment 
of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other 
arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. 
Id. at 1093 (emphasis added).  Congress later enacted legislation that ratified and 
confirmed Executive Order 9066.  See 18 U.S.C. § 97a (1946). 
 241. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. at 1093.  On March 18, 1942, President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9102, establishing the “War Relocation Authority,” 
which reaffirmed Executive Order 9066 and provided for the “removal from designated 
areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security.”  See 
Exec. Order No. 9102, 3 C.F.R. 1123–25 (1938–1943). 
 242. See John Tateishi & William Yoshino, The Japanese American Incarceration: 
The Journey to Redress, HUM. RTS., Spring 2000, at 10.  The internment was ordered for 
the purpose of protecting against “fifth column” sabotage or Japanese attack.  Joel B. 
Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional 
Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 649, 651 
(1997).  On March 2, 1942, General J.L. DeWitt, Military Commander of the Western 
Defense Command, issued the first of four proclamations under the authority of 
Executive Order 9066.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943).  The first 
proclamation established that persons may be removed, as the situation may require, in 
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Within eleven months after Pearl Harbor, 119,803 men, women, and 
children of Japanese ancestry boarded buses and trains for government 
detention camps in seven states.243  Two-thirds of those incarcerated 
were U.S. citizens forced to abandon their businesses and homes, 
“suffering extensive property, income, and psychological damage as a 
result.”244 
The validity of the government’s action ultimately made its way 
through the courts in a trio of cases.  First, in Hirabayashi v. United 
States,245 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a curfew 
placed on Japanese Americans.246  As a defense measure implemented to 
safeguard important military areas from sabotage by sympathetic 
persons of Japanese ancestry (and at a time of threatened air raids and 
invasion by Japanese forces), the curfew order was ruled a proper 
exercise of war powers.247  Further, the Court held that the curfew did 
 
“military areas and zones” comprising “the southern part of Arizona [and] all the coastal 
region of the three Pacific Coast states [including California, Washington, and Oregon].”  
Id. at 86–87.  The second proclamation expanded these areas.  Id. at 87.  The third 
proclamation established curfew rules.  In particular, it stated that from March 27, 1942, 
all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to stay in their residences from eight 
o’clock in the evening to six o’clock in the morning.  Id. at 88.  Violation of curfew led 
to criminal penalties.  Id.  The fourth proclamation recited the need to provide the 
orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese within the area, and “prohibited all alien 
Japanese and all persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving the military area until future 
orders should permit.”  Id. at 89. 
 243. See Huong Vu, Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security Is 
Paved by Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 665 (2002) (arguing that racism shaped 
national policy); see also Tateishi & Yoshino, supra note 242, at 10.  Soon after the 
military imposed curfew laws, the military posted notices ordering all Japanese aliens 
and U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry “to report to assembly areas, and to bring with 
them only what they could carry.”  Id.  The government referred to these areas as 
“relocation centers.”  Id.  Japanese Americans were then deported and imprisoned behind 
barbed wire in ten detention camps located in remote and desolate areas of “California, 
Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Wyoming, and Arkansas.”  Id.  “Life in the camps was 
harsh, with internees enduring the desert heat, cold, and dust storms in hastily 
constructed wooden barracks with no privacy, poor food, and very little in the way of 
meaningful activity.”  Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American 
Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 5 (2001). 
 244. Vu, supra note 243, at 665; see also Philip Tajitsu Nash, Moving for Redress, 
94 YALE L.J. 743, 743 (1985) (reviewing JOHN TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN 
ORAL HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN DETENTION CAMPS (1984)). 
 245. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 246. Id. at 104. 
 247. Id. at 98–100.  The Court’s inquiry to the constitutionality of the curfew laws 
was: 
whether in the light of all the facts and circumstances there was any substantial 
basis for the conclusion . . . that the curfew as applied was a protective 
measure necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would 
substantially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be expected to 
aid a threatened enemy invasion. 
Id. at 95.  The facts and circumstances considered by the Court were (1) the fact that a 
large number of resident alien Japanese were of “mature years” and occupied positions 
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not unconstitutionally discriminate because the surrounding circumstances, 
including the war and nature of Japanese communities in the United 
States, afforded substantial bases for the military’s conclusion that 
persons of Japanese ancestry required differential treatment.248 
In Korematsu v. United States,249 the Court continued to grant the 
military great deference by upholding the constitutionality of the 
government’s forced relocation of Japanese Americans, even though the 
threat of a Japanese invasion had all but disappeared.250  However, in Ex 
 
of influence in Japanese communities, which they used to disseminate propaganda for 
the Japanese Government; and (2) the fact that conditions affecting the life of the 
Japanese resulted in little social intercourse between them and the “white population,” 
further leading to sources of Japanese irritation and isolation.  Id. at 98.  Hirabayashi’s 
conviction was later vacated in 1987.  See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 
608 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 248. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100–02.  The Court gave the government great 
deference: 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time 
of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a 
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.  Nor can we deny 
that Congress, and the military authorities acting with its authorization, have 
constitutional power to appraise the danger in the light of facts of public 
notoriety.  We need not now attempt to define the ultimate boundaries of the 
war power.  We decide only the issue as we have defined it—we decide only 
that the curfew order as applied, and at the time it was applied, was within the 
boundaries of the war power.  In this case it is enough that circumstances 
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining 
the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.  
Whether we would have made it is irrelevant. 
Id. at 101–02. 
 249. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 250. See id. at 223.  The petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was 
convicted in federal district court for remaining in San Leandro, California, a designated 
military area from which all persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded pursuant to 
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command.  
Id. at 215–16.  In upholding the conviction, the Court admitted: “Compulsory exclusion 
of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst 
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions,” but 
“when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, 
the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.”  Id. at 219–20.  
Moreover, the Court noted that Korematsu was not excluded from the designated 
military area because of his race, but because the United States was 
at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military 
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take 
proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the 
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from 
the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence 
in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined 
that they should have the power to do just this. 
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parte Mitsuye Endo, the Court held that the government’s continued 
detention of an admittedly “loyal” citizen at a time when hostilities were 
coming to an end was not within the scope of the 1942 Act, which 
ratified and confirmed executive order 9066.251  In Endo, the Court 
prohibited lawmakers from placing a greater restraint on citizens than 
what was “clearly and unmistakably” indicated in the language of 
Executive Order 9066.252 
Although issued at a time of war between Japan and the United States, 
President Roosevelt’s executive orders similarly fail to meet all four 
prongs of the security legislation test253 and are consequently unjustifiable 
as appropriate national security measures.  The first prong requires the 
demonstration of aggression implicating a substantial U.S. interest.  
Even in the midst of heavy criticism that race was the true reason 
Japanese Americans were forced into internment camps,254 deference 
must be given to the government’s judgment that the internment was 
necessary to protect the substantial U.S. interest—that of safeguarding 
against espionage and sabotage of national defense targets.255  The first 
prong, however controversial, appears to be satisfied.  Yet, Executive 
Orders 9066 and 9012 do not fulfill the remaining three elements.  First, 
rather than affecting only a specified class of persons precisely defined 
by statute, President Roosevelt’s orders allowed for the removal of “any 
or all persons” from exclusive areas designated under the full discretion 
of the Secretary of War.256  Second, the government failed to define the 
 
Id. at 223.  The petitioner’s conviction was later vacated on April 19, 1984.  See 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 251. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).  The Court determined that 
Americans of Japanese ancestry who accepted U.S. institutions and worked “loyally” for 
the nation made a valuable contribution to the nation’s wealth and well-being.  As such, 
the Court noted that it was important, even at times of war, “to maintain a high standard 
of fair, considerate, and equal treatment for the people of this minority as of all other 
minorities.”  Id. at 303–04. 
 252. See id. at 300. 
 253. See supra Part IV.B. 
 254. See Vu, supra note 243, at 672–73 (examining Japanese-U.S. race relations 
and quoting President Roosevelt and General DeWitt as having deeply rooted anti-
Japanese sentiment and distrust over Japanese American loyalty).  In newspaper 
interviews, DeWitt was quoted as saying, “a Jap’s a Jap.”  Id. at 673. 
 255. See supra note 240. 
 256. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1938–1943).  The affected class of 
persons is vague, especially compared to the more specific Public Proclamation No. 3, 
which declared the following: 
[F]rom and after March 27, 1942, “all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all 
alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the 
geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 . . . shall be within their place of 
residence between the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M.” 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943). 
Compare also with the more specified March 24, 1942 civilian exclusion orders that 
directed all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and nonalien, be excluded from a 
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exact duration of the internment period, leaving the detention camps 
solely in military control.257  Third, the orders failed to provide an 
appropriate and specified appellate process by which Japanese 
Americans could contest their detention.258 
C.  Dazed and Confused: Judicial Review in the Wrong Court 
Assuming that national security concerns fail to justify depriving 
foreign groups of their due process rights, the district court’s decision to 
invalidate the AEDPA in Rahmani is unfounded because appellants must 
challenge designations under the AEDPA in the D.C. Circuit.259  Both 
disputants involved agreed that the D.C. Circuit was the sole venue for 
judicial review of designations pursuant to § 1189.260  Nevertheless, the 
court in Rahmani overstepped its bounds and ruled that the “tribunal 
entrusted with reviewing . . . designation[s] for compliance with the 
Constitution . . . is not the sole arbiter of Section 1189’s constitutionality.”261 
Although § 1189 clearly directs petitioners to seek judicial review in 
the D.C. Circuit, the court contended that the statute does not restrict 
review exclusively to one court.262  Citing Johnson v. Robison,263 the 
 
specified portion of Military Area No. 1 in Seattle from May 16, 1942.  Id.  The civilian 
exclusion orders also required a member of each family, and each individual living 
alone, affected by the order to report on May 11 or May 12 to a designated civil control 
station in Seattle.  Id. at 89. 
 257. The internment had no finite end date.  The internment ended January 2, 1945, 
but Executive Order 9066 remained in effect until President Gerald Ford rescinded it on 
February 9, 1976.  Vu, supra note 243, at 669 n.55 (“President Ford called the 
evacuation and internment ‘national mistakes’ and a ‘setback to fundamental American 
principles’” (quoting Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1976–1977)).). 
 258. Absent a specific procedure of judicial review, Japanese Americans’ only 
chance to retain review was to be convicted for violating curfew and evacuation orders, 
and to then seek to dismiss the indictments in court.  See Saito, supra note 243, at 5 (tracking 
the constitutional challenges brought by Japanese Americans Gordon Hirabayashi, 
Minoru Yasui, Fred Korematsu, and Mitsuye Endo during World War II). 
 259. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (2000).  It is true that the defendants in Rahmani 
sought only to dismiss the indictments charging them with providing material support to 
designated foreign terrorist organizations pursuant to § 2339B.  United States v. 
Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  Yet, the defendants also 
challenged the designations themselves because members of Congress disagreed with the 
Secretary’s administrative record, causing a degree of uncertainty in the Secretary’s 
designations.  Id. at 1050–52.  The district court went further in its analysis and chose to 
review the designations at issue, despite having no statutory authorization pursuant to § 
1189.  See id. at 1053–54. 
 260. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
 261. Id. at 1053–54 (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. at 1053. 
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court refused to interpret the statute as restricting access to judicial 
review without the government demonstrating “clear and convincing 
evidence of Congressional intent to impose such a restriction.”264  
Without explaining what the evidentiary standard entails or how the 
government may meet this standard, the court concluded that the 
language provided by § 1189 fails to “evince a clear and convincing 
congressional intent to foreclose judicial review of a designation by 
other federal courts.”265 
Moreover, the court pointed to the D.C. Circuit’s past “inability to 
conduct an effective judicial review” in both National Council and 
People’s Mojahedin as further proof that the D.C. Circuit is not the only 
court that may evaluate designations.266  In what can only be described 
 
 263. 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974). 
 264. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1053. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1053–54.  As an example of the D.C. Circuit’s “inability,” the district 
court cited to an observation made by the D.C. Circuit in reviewing the designation of 
the PMOI in the People’s Mojahedin opinion: “The information recited [in the 
administrative record] is certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be 
received in court.  It is instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a record, from 
sources named and unnamed, the accuracy of which we have no way of evaluating.”  Id. 
at 1053 n.10 (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original).  Notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit’s general 
frustration with the Secretary’s administrative record, the court in People’s Mojahedin 
continued to perform its appellate function and determined that upon the Secretary’s 
findings, the PMOI was properly designated.  People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 24–25.  
The D.C. Circuit realized that its only function was to decide if the Secretary, “on the 
face of things,” had enough information to come to the conclusion that designated 
organizations were (1) foreign and (2) engaged in terrorism.  Id. at 25.  As to whether the 
terrorist activity of the organization threatened U.S. national security, the third factor in 
designating a foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA, the D.C. Circuit refrained 
from resolving the issue because it raised a political question.  Id. at 23–24 (citing Chi. & 
S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (noting that judicial 
review entails performing the role Congress intended for the court without thrusting the 
judiciary into the political realm).  Political questions, the D.C. Circuit explained, are 
political judgments and “‘decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, 
facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political 
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.’”  Id. at 23 (quoting Chi. & S. Air 
Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 111).  The district court in Rahmani even agreed, refraining from 
settling the debate between members of the legislative branch and the Secretary 
regarding the designation of the MEK because “[w]hether the MEK is a foreign terrorist 
organization presents a political question.”  Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1051–52 
(listing six independent factors indicative of a political question and concluding that for 
the court to weigh in on the debate would create “the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”).  The court noted 
that while the decision to designate is “nonjusticiable” and better left for the greater 
factfinding resources of Congress, the court may nonetheless review the designation 
procedure for conformance with the Constitution.  Id. at 1052.  Contrary to the Rahmani 
court’s perception, the D.C. Circuit demonstrated the ability, rather than the inability, to 
conduct effective judicial review and to conduct the rather difficult task of acknowledging 
a political question when presented. 
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as unsubstantiated judicial commentary, the court specifically criticized 
the D.C. Circuit for upholding designations while acknowledging, in the 
same opinion, that a designation under the AEDPA violates due 
process.267  With little reason, the court utilized its displeasure with the 
D.C. Circuit as an excuse to weigh in on § 1189’s constitutionality even 
though it lacked any statutory authorization to do so. 
As to requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court’s reasoning is 
flawed.  The court in Johnson v. Robison addressed a statute that 
prohibited substantive judicial review of decisions made by the 
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs (Administrator), who denied the 
plaintiff’s application for educational assistance even though the plaintiff 
claimed he was entitled to certain benefits as an eligible veteran of the 
Armed Forces.268  The Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the statute 
violated his First Amendment guarantee of religious freedom and Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.269  The Supreme 
Court examined the history behind the statute’s “no-review” clause, by 
which Congress intended to ensure that veterans’ benefits claims would 
not burden the courts and that complex benefits decisions by the 
Administrator would be made uniformly.270  However, the Court did not 
find a congressional intention to bar judicial review of constitutional 
questions and cited to the clear and convincing evidence standard set 
forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.271 
 
 267. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.  This criticism is from the D.C. Circuit 
opinion in National Council.  See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text.  As 
evidence that the Rahmani decision is poorly written, the opinion openly criticizes 
National Council without describing, analyzing, refuting, citing, or referring to any 
specific component of National Council. 
 268. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 362–65 (1974).  Under the statutory scheme 
of the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) provides: 
On and after October 17, 1940, except as provided in sections 775, 784, and as 
to matters arising under chapter 37 of this title, the decisions of the 
Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by 
the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their 
dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or 
any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any 
such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise. 
Id. at 365 n.5 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1970)). 
 269. Id. at 364. 
 270. Id. at 369–70. 
 271. Id. at 373–74 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)).  The 
Court concluded that no explicit provision of § 211(a) bars the judicial consideration of 
one’s constitutional claims.  Id. at 367.  Rather, the prohibitions intended to exclude 
review solely of those “decisions of law or fact” that arose out of the administration of 
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Similarly, Abbott Laboratories involved a statute that prohibited 
substantive judicial review of claims contesting a regulation promulgated 
by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (Commissioner).272  The 
regulation required manufacturers of prescription drugs to include on 
labels and other printed material the drug’s “established name” as well as 
its “proprietary” or trade name.273 The plaintiffs argued that this regulation 
was beyond the statutory right conferred upon the Commissioner.274  
After analyzing previous statutory drafts, including special review 
procedures “applying to regulations embodying technical factual 
determinations,” the Court concluded that Congress had never intended 
to eliminate judicial review of other types of regulations enforced by the 
Commissioner, including the regulation of drug labels.275 
Unlike the legislation in Johnson and Abbott Laboratories, the 
AEDPA does not limit substantive judicial review.  Conversely, the 
AEDPA authorizes the review of a variety of legal challenges.  These 
include claims, consistent with Johnson, that the Act is contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity, and that, consistent 
with Abbott Laboratories, the Act is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitation.276  The fact that Congress limits procedural review 
to one court is inconsistent with the requirement that the government 
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of congressional intent to 
limit substantive judicial review.  In essence, the district court is the 
improper venue for review of § 1189’s constitutionality.  The opinion in 
Rahmani should therefore be stricken.277 
 
providing benefits for veterans, not claims that arise under the Constitution.  Id. 
 272. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 137–38. 
 273. Id.  Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the “‘established name’ 
is one designated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,” whereas the 
“‘proprietary name’ is usually a trade name under which a particular drug is marketed.”  
Id. at 138.  The Act required manufacturers to print the established name of the drug 
“prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary 
name.”  Id. at 137–38.  
 274. Id. at 138–39.  The action was brought by thirty-seven drug manufacturers and 
by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, which includes manufacturers of 
more than ninety percent of the U.S. supply of prescription drugs.  Id. 
 275. Id. at 144.  Moreover, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act allows an 
appeal on a record to an agency’s factual determination, such as the “level of tolerance 
for poisonous sprays on apple crops,” under the substantial evidence test, thus “affording 
a considerably more generous judicial review than the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test 
available in the traditional injunctive suit.”  Id. at 143. 
 276. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3) (2000). 
 277. Perhaps the decision in Rahmani should not come as such a surprise.  Presiding 
Judge Robert M. Takasugi, along with his family, had been among the thousands 
incarcerated by the United States in Japanese internment camps during World War II.  
Michael R. Mitchell, Hon. Robert M. Takasugi, http://www.geocities.com/mraley.geo/ 
rmt.html (last revised Oct. 22, 1997).  Not surprisingly, five months after Rahmani, 
Judge Takasugi invalidated a new aviation law that prohibited non-U.S. citizens from 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The AEDPA is a necessary tool to be used in America’s quest to 
combat new age threats of terrorism.  The Act works to prevent the 
United States from becoming a base for funding acts of terror.  It deters 
terrorist organizations, such as the al Qaeda network, acting as 
multinational corporations with “operations, logistics, and financial 
cells . . . all interlinked and interdependent,” from seeking aid in the very 
country they seek to destroy.278  The AEDPA provides sufficient safeguards 
to assure that the constitutional rights of loyal American citizens or those 
who merely wish to express their affiliation with certain groups will not 
be compromised, but that the rights of active donors and participants 
may need to be. 
For America to be successful in its quest to protect its national 
security, Americans must understand that the war against terrorism will 
not be won by a passive government.  Radical views will not stay silent, 
and terrorist cells will not vanish.  Far from advocating a complete 
confiscation of democratic principles and freedoms, Congress must be 
allowed to suppress the effectiveness of an enemy that is void of flesh 
and blood, name and face.  Indeed, an encompassing hatred for the 
United States is now the true enemy.  Our nation must not be afraid to 
fully use the Constitution to squash this sentiment. 
The story continues.  On July 22, 2003, a New York district court 
added its opinion to the murky AEDPA landscape.  In United States v. 
Sattar,279 the court held the following: (1) Section 2339A(b) is 
 
working as airport passenger and baggage screeners under the Constitution.  News 
Release, California District Judge Rules in Favor of Non-U.S. Citizen Airport Screeners, 
Consulate General of the Philippines New York (Nov. 18, 2002), available at 
http://philconsulateny.home.mindspring.com/news/news013.htm; see also Press Release, 
Court Denies Government Motion to Dismiss Airport Screeners’ Case, National Asian 
Pacific American Legal Consortium (Nov. 15, 2002), available at http://www. 
napalc.org/programs/immigration/pr/2002-11-15_Gebin.htm. 
 278. See Phillip Carter, Al Qaeda and the Advent of Multinational Terrorism: Why 
“Material Support” Prosecutions Are Key in the War on Terrorism, at http://writ. 
news.findlaw.com/student/20030312_carter.html (Mar. 12, 2003) (describing the scope of 
al Qaeda’s global Internet capacities, global money movement, and how the network 
“hides behind legitimate businesses and charities”). 
 279. 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Defendants Ahmed Abdel Sattar (also 
known as Dr. Ahmed), Yassir Al-Sirri, Lynne Stewart, and Mohammed Yousry “were 
charged in a five-count indictment on April 8, 2002.”  Id. at 352.  Count two charged the 
defendants with “providing and attempting to provide material support and resources” to 
the Islamic Group (IG), which “existed as an international terrorist group dedicated to 
opposing nations, governments, institutions, and individuals that did not share [its] 
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unconstitutionally vague with regard to the statute’s prohibition on 
providing material support or resources in the form of “communications 
equipment” and “personnel”;280 (2) only designated terrorist organizations, 
not individual defendants charged with providing material support to 
designated terrorist organizations, can challenge the underlying 
designation;281 and (3) the AEDPA did not violate the defendant’s First 
 
radical interpretation of Islamic law.”  Id. at 353.  IG, while allegedly operating in the 
New York metropolitan area from the early 1990s until the 2002 indictment, defined 
“‘jihad’ as waging opposition against infidels by whatever means necessary” and 
considered the United States as an infidel.  Id.  The indictment listed IG’s objectives in 
the United States as (1) establishing “a staging ground for violent acts against targets in 
the United States and abroad”; (2) “recruit[ing] and training of members”; and (3) 
“fundraising for jihad actions in the United States and overseas.”  Id.  “[D]esignated as a 
foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State on October 8, 1997 [under § 
1189],” IG was redesignated twice, first in October of 1999 and again on October 5, 
2001.  Id.  In October 1995, IG’s spiritual leader Sheikh Abdel Rahman was convicted 
for conspiring “to wage a war of urban terrorism against the United States, including the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot to bomb New York City landmarks.”  Id. 
at 354.  The indictment also charged that defendant Sattar served as a “vital link” 
between Rahman and the worldwide IG leadership, and that Sattar acted as an IG 
communications portal from New York City by maintaining frequent telephone contact 
with global IG leaders.  Id. at 355. 
 280. Id. at 358–60.  The indictment alleged: 
[T]he defendants and the unindicted co-conspirators provided communications 
equipment and other physical assets, including telephones, computers and 
telefax machines, owned, operated and possessed by themselves and others, to 
IG, in order to transmit, pass and disseminate messages, communications and 
information between and among IG leaders and members in the United States 
and elsewhere around the world . . . . 
Id. at 356 (citation omitted).  The government initially argued in its brief that the 
defendants were not charged simply for using their phones but rather for actively making 
communications equipment available to IG that otherwise would be unavailable to a 
designated foreign terrorist organization.  Id. at 358.  The government then “changed 
course” and argued that the use of the defendants’ telephones alone constituted criminal 
conduct under the statute.  Id.  The district court used this change in the government’s 
interpretation of § 2339B as the basis for holding the provision of “communications 
equipment” unconstitutionally vague: “[A] criminal defendant simply could not be 
expected to know that the conduct alleged was prohibited by the statute.”  Id.  As to 
“personnel,” the district court deferred to the Ninth Circuit decision in Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Reno rather than United States v. Lindh, stating: “The fact that the ‘hard 
core’ conduct in Lindh fell within the plain meaning of providing personnel yields no 
standards that can be applied to the conduct by alleged ‘quasi-employees’ in this case.”  
Id. at 359; see supra Part III.B.3. 
 281. Id. at 363–64.  The district court found that, first, the AEDPA clearly allows a 
designated foreign terrorist organization to challenge its designation in the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia under § 1189(b), and second, individual defendants 
could not raise a terrorist organization’s due process concerns because litigants “never 
have standing to challenge a statute solely on the ground that it failed to provide due 
process to third parties not before the court.”  Id. at 364.  The designation of IG as a 
foreign terrorist organization, thus, was irrelevant as to the defendants.  Id.  In review, 
the district court found the Rahmani holding, which allowed litigants to challenge the 
due process of designation, neither binding nor persuasive.  Id.  The court further 
distinguished Rahmani from Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953), and 
AGARWAL.DOC 9/17/2019  11:04 AM 
[VOL. 41:  839, 2004]  Obstructing Justice 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 901 
Amendment associational rights.282  More recently, on March 17, 2004, 
the District Court for the Central District of California held another 
component of § 2339A(b), the term “expert advice or assistance” added 
by the Patriot Act in 2001, impermissibly vague, becoming the first 
court to hold a part of the Patriot Act unconstitutional.283 
As to United States v. Rahmani, the United States filed its appeal in 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 12, 2002.284  On April 3, 
2003, the government filed its reply brief, and while it makes reference 
to national security concerns, the government focuses on refuting the 
defendants’ key arguments that the AEDPA violates First Amendment 
freedom of association and expression.285  In a case of déjà vu, the 
 
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), cases “in which the defendants 
were allowed to challenge the administrative orders that formed the basis for their 
prosecution although the relevant statutes did not provide for judicial review,” because 
“[r]aising the defense in the criminal cases provided those defendants the only 
meaningful review of the administrative proceeding affecting them.”  Id. at 365–66.  In 
contrast, the AEDPA provides a designated organization, not defendants charged under 
the AEDPA, with judicial review of its own designation, and “that review is not to occur 
as a defense in a criminal proceeding.”  Id. at 366.  Moreover, the validity of the 
designation is itself not an element of the offense of providing material support to 
designated organizations (the government only needs to prove that the defendants 
conspired to provide or did provide material support or resources to a designated 
organization), thus the defendants’ due process right is not affected by their incapacity to 
challenge the designation process.  Id. at 367–68. 
 282. Id. at 368.  The district court deferred to Humanitarian Law Project, holding 
that the AEDPA does not interfere with First Amendment associational rights because 
“the material support restriction ‘is not aimed at interfering with the expressive 
component of [the defendant’s] conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist groups.’”  Id. at 
368 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 283. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV 03-6107 ABC (MCx), 
2004 WL 547534, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2004); see also Federal Judge Rules Part 
of Patriot Act Unconstitutional, CNN.COM (Jan. 26, 2004) (quoting libertarian David 
Cole, who argued the case against the provision, as proclaiming “the ruling ‘a victory for 
everyone who believes the war on terrorism ought to be fought consistent with 
constitutional principles’”), at http://www.CNN.com/2004/01/26/patriot.act.ap. 
 284. General Docket (No. 02-50355), U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
U.S. v. Rahmani (filed July 17, 2002).  After the district court ruling in Rahmani, one 
U.S. official said that there would “be serious problems if the decision stands on appeal.”  
Ben Barber, Judge Strikes Down Law Citing Groups as Terrorist, WASH. TIMES, June 
27, 2002, at A01.  For example, the U.S. government would no longer be able to 
“prosecute those who give material support to groups . . . such as Hamas [also known as 
the Islamic Resistance Movement], al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad [also known as the al-Jihad] 
and Hezbollah [also known as Party of God and the Organization of the Oppressed on 
Earth].”  Id.; see also Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 
52,650, 52,650–51 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
 285. Telephone Interview with Judith Heinz, Assistant United States Attorney, 
United States Attorneys Office Criminal Division, Los Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 26, 2003).  
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Ninth Circuit, as it did in Humanitarian Law Project, will again get a 
chance to uphold the AEDPA in the face of these challenges.  This 
time, however, the court needs to do more.  It needs to resurrect the 



















The Ninth Circuit received an amicus brief from the ACLU of Northern California on 
February 20, 2003, which was officially filed on July 30, 2003.  Id.  Oral argument took 
place on September 9, 2003, submitted to Ninth Circuit Justices Andrew J. Kleinfeld, 
Kim M. Wardlaw, and William A. Fletcher.  Id. 
